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INTRODUCTION

Uncertainty and delay in patent litigation may have unforeseen
virtues. The combination of these oft-criticized characteristics1
might induce a limited amount of infringement that enhances social
welfare without reducing

(or

without substantially reducing) the

profitability of the patentee. Patent infringement is generally
viewed as socially inefficient because infringement reduces the pat
entee's ex ante incentive to innovate. Limited amounts of infringe
ment combined with increased patent duration, however, can
substantially reduce the distortionary ex post effects of supra1. See, e.g., Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation?
The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 699 {1998) {"Long delays be
tween the filing and issuance of biotechnology patents aggravate the problem of concurrent
fragments. During this period of pendency, there is substantial uncertainty as to the scope of
patent rights that will ultimately issue."). However, uncertainty has already been shown to
be desirable in some special cases. First, Howard F. Chang, Patent Scope, Antitrust Policy,
and Cumulative Innovation, 26 RAND J. EcoN. 34 {1995); Jerry R. Green & Suzanne
Scotchmer, On the Division of Profit in Sequential Innovation, 26 RAND J. EcoN. 20 {1995);
and Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the
Patent Law, 5 J. EcoN. PERSP. 29 {1991), have shown that uncertainty about whether follow
on innovation would infringe a patent might be desirable. See infra note 73. Second, uncer
tainty about which of two competing innovators' patent-claims on innovation will be valid is
equivalent to each innovation receiving a small prize in expectation, which might attract
more innovators to enter an R&D contest. See Richard Gilbert & Paul Klemperer, An Equi
librium Theory of Rationing, RAND J. EcoN. {forthcoming 1999). Third, uncertainty about
which claim is valid (which is economically equivalent to joint ownership of the rights to
produce) can result in more efficient bargaining over the rights. See Ian Ayres & Eric Talley,
Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement To Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE
L.J. 1027 {1995); Peter Cramton et al., Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently, 55
ECONOMETRICA 615 {1987).
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competitive pricing without reducing the patentee's ex ante incen
tives to innovate. Indeed, this Article derives a legal regime that
preserves the incentive to innovate by giving the patentee the same
expected profits, but that substantially increases efficiency in com
parison with an "idealized" patent regime (in which a patentee can
instantaneously win an injunction to stop infringement).
Legal scholars have failed to appreciate that unconstrained mo
nopoly pricing is not a cost-justified means of rewarding patentees.2
The last bit of monopoly pricing produces large amounts of dead
weight loss for a relatively small amount of patentee profit. If soci

ety wants to use patent profits to induce innovation, it should

choose the method of producing a particular level of profit that pro
duces the least cost to society. But allowing patentees to raise price
all the way to the monopoly level is a little like giving them a license
to steal car radios - it produces a social cost (to car owners) far
greater than the private benefit. The dual thesis of this Article is
that

(1)

efficient patent policy should strive to give patentees con

strained market power, and

(2)

an enforcement regime with uncer

tainty and delay (in conjunction with the appropriate patent
duration) may be one way of achieving this policy goal. Even if
readers ultimately are unwilling to accept uncertainty and delay as
tools to constrain patentees' market power, the insight that the last
bit of monopoly pricing provides disproportionately small profits in
comparison to its social cost should be of continuing independent
concern to policymakers seeking an optimal enforcement regime.
Although this Article begins with a reductive mathematical
model to show how uncertainty and delay can induce limited
amounts of infringement, the purpose is not to propose a system in
which the validity of patents is uncertain and only resolved ex post.
Instead, appreciating how uncertainty and delay can constrain the
patentee's market power can illuminate practical policy issues. For
example, our model suggests ways to distinguish between the utility
of different types of uncertainty. "Type I" uncertainty (which in
creases the chance that valid patents will not be enforced) is likely
to be more efficient than "Type II" uncertainty (which increases the

2. Economists have understood that reducing the price of patented products with com
pulsory licensing and increasing the patent length (to maintain the patentee's expected
profit) can increase welfare. See, e.g., Richard Gilbert & Carl Shapiro, Optimal Patent
Length and Breadth, 21 RAND J. EcoN. 106 (1990); Paul Klemperer, How Broad Should the
Scope of Patent Protection Be? 21 RAND J. EcoN. 113 (1990); Pankaj Tandon, Optimal Pat
ents with Compulsory Licensing, 90 J. PoL. EcoN. 470 (1982). The core insight of this Article
is that delay and uncertainty can have the same beneficial effects on limiting the patentee's
exploitation of market power.
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chance that invalid patents will be enforced).3 This suggests that

recent efforts of the Federal Circuit to expand the use of prelimi
nary injunctions may not be cost-justified - as they are likely to
expand Type II uncertainty and reduce Type I uncertainty. The
costs of Type I uncertainty and delay are not as great as previously
thought, and we may not want to expend substantial resources to
eliminate this feature of the current system. Appreciating the bene
fits of uncertainty argues against giving patentees a presumptive
right to preliminary injunctions against infringement, and militates
instead in favor of relatively stingy ex post measures of make-whole
damages. Underinclusive "standards" for determining when a pat
ent is valid are likely to be more efficient than either "rules" (which
resolve uncertainty ex ante) or overinclusive standards.
Courts often argue that

(1)

patents, as a form of property, must

include the right to injunctively exclude, and

(2)

failure to grant

injunctions will lead to unlimited infringement, which would sub

stantially undermine a patentee's incentive to innovate.4 We con
test both of these claims.

Instead of accepting the essentialist

notion that the "very nature" of property is the right to exclude, we
suggest that the nature of patents should be to offer sufficient re
wards to stimulate innovation. Denying immediate injunctive relief
and substituting delayed probabilistic determination with monetary
damages will only produce limited amounts of infringement and

need not (especially when combined with extended patent life) re
duce the ex ante incentive to innovate.
To highlight the perverse benefits of uncertainty and delay, this

Article purposely abstracts from addressing which innovations are
deserving of protection or what reward for innovation would be op
timal.5 Patent policy has to resolve two core issues:

(1)

how much

of a reward should be granted to induce sufficient innovation; and

(2)

how can this desired reward be produced for the innovator with

the least social inefficiency. This paper takes on the second ques
tion. Regardless of how much profit society decides to grant a pat3. The terms "Type I" and "Type II" are inspired by classical hypothesis testing. As tradi
tionally defined, the possibility that a true null hypothesis will be rejected is referred to as a
"TYPe I" error, while the possibility that a false null hypothesis will not be rejected is referred
to as a "Type II" error. See James E. Krier, Risk and Design, 19 J. LEG. STUD. 781, 784
(1990); infra note 85. We are implicitly defining the null hypothesis to be that a patent is
valid, but we have no strong view on which type of error should be defined as 'fype I or II.
4. See infra section III.A.
5. For leading analyses of these issues, see WILLIAM D. NoRDHAUS, INVENTION,
GRowrn, AND WELFARE {1969); F.M. Scherer, Nordhaus' Theory of Optimal Patent Life: A
Geometric Reinterpretation, 62 AM. EcoN. REv. 422 {1972); and Robert P. Merges & Richard
R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 CoLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990).
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entee, this Article shows that a regime with some uncertainty and
delay can produce this reward more efficiently than a regime in
which enforcement is instantaneous and certain.
A.

The Intuition: Why It Is Possible to Restrict Patentees' Market
Power Without Reducing Innovation Incentives

Before demonstrating how uncertainty and delay restrict market
power by inducing limited infringement, it is useful to explain why
restricting patentees' market power is a worthy goal. Two intuitions
suggest the worth of restricting patentee market power - one re
lating to fixed and the other to increased patent length. For con
venience, we will refer to these intuitions as the "stationarity

intuition" and the "Ramsey intuition."

The Stationarity Intuition.

Small restrictions in the patentee's

monopoly market power are efficient - even if these restrictions

reduce the patentee's expected profits. The reason is that the last
increment by which an unconstrained patentee chooses to increase
price hurts society much more than it helps the patentee. Because
an unconstrained patentee maximizes profits by choosing the quan
tity or price that reaches a flat point - what mathematicians call a
stationary point - on the profit surface, small changes away from
the profit-maximizing price or quantity will have only second-order
effects on profits.6 But small decreases in price will have first-order

effects on the deadweight loss - so that reductions in price have
larger impacts on welfare than profits.

FIGURE 1
Price

PM
P'

i---
,_____....

D
Marginal Cost

OM Q'

Quantity

6. The "envelope theorem" also exploits this aspect of the maxima (or minima) of func
tions. See George A. Akerlof & Janet L. Yellen, Can Small Deviations from Rationality
Make Significant Differences to Economic Equilibria? 15 AM. EcoN. REv. 708 (1985); Ian
Ayres, Pushing the Envelope: Antitrust Implications ofthe Envelope Theorem, 17 Miss. C. L.
REv. 21 (1996).
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The intuition for this result can be seen in Figure 1. A reduction
in the monopoly price from PM to P' has two effects on the paten
tee's profits: the lower price reduces the profits on current sales
(the reduction in profits is represented by the area of rectangle A),
but the lower price also increases the quantity sold (from QM to Q')
at a supra-competitive price (this increase in profits is represented
by the area of rectangle B). So geometrically, the effect on profits
of lowering the price below the monopoly level is:
Effect on Profits

=

Area B

-

Area A

The patentee acting as a monopolist would choose a price where
these two effects on profits were completely offsetting - but even
reductions below the monopoly price cause a relatively small de
crease in profits because the increase in profits from additional
sales (Area B) almost offsets the decrease in profits from a lower
price (Area A).
This reduction in profits is especially small in comparison with
the increase in social welfare (consumer and producer surplus). As
shown geometrically in Figure 1, the increase in welfare caused by
lowering the monopoly price is:
Effect on Welfare

=

Area B

+

Area C

From antitrust scholarship, it is well known that the patentee's loss
of Area A profits does not reduce social welfare because what the
patentee loses in this area, the consumer gains. But what is not
often emphasized is that the effect on profits is much smaller than
the effect on social welfare. Because of the offsetting profit rectan
gles, the effect on profits is second-order in comparison with the
first-order effect on social welfare.
The next section will show in a simple linear example that re
ducing the monopoly price by 10% might only reduce the paten
tee's profits by 1 %, but can reduce the social costs of monopoly by
19%.7 Because the last bit of monopoly overcharging is so dispro
portionately damaging, restricting the patentee's monopoly power a
small amount is likely to increase social welfare. The benefit of re
ducing the deadweight loss of supra-competitive pricing is likely to
outweigh the costs of a slightly lower incentive to innovate.8
The Ramsey Intuition. While the stationarity intuition only per
tains to small changes away from the profit-maximizing output, a
7. See infra Table 1.
8. But cf. infra text accompanying notes 36-37 (describing pathological example in which
elasticity of innovation with respect to expected profit was extremely high).
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second intuition applies to even larger reductions in market power.
To wit: larger restrictions in a patentee's monopoly power are effi
cient, if the patent's length is increased to keep the patentee's ex
pected profit constant.9 If we hold patentees' profits constant by

appropriately lengthening the patent life, consumers would be bet
ter off living under oligopolistic pricing for a longer period than

monopoly pricing for a shorter period. The intuition for this trade
off between market power and duration can be seen as an implica
tion of inter-temporal "Ramsey pricing."10
Ramsey pricing minimizes the distortionary effect (read: dead
weight loss) of generating a given amount of tax revenue. The opti
mal tax structure for generating a given amount of revenue will

tend to (1) tax as many goods as possible (so as to create small
distortions in a broad variety of markets),11 and (2) tax goods with

inelastic demands more severely than goods with elastic demand.
The first implication - regarding broad-based tax schemes - is
particularly relevant to patent policy.
Allowing a patentee to charge a supra-competitive price is
analogous to allowing a patentee to impose a tax - because both
induce deadweight loss. The Ramsey intuition by itself suggests
that government would want to place a small tax on all products to
generate a given reward for a patentee. The problem with this ap
proach is that government does not have sufficient information to
know how much of a reward is appropriate for a particular product.
Giving patentees the ability to charge monopoly profits allows the
government to tie the size of the reward in a rough way to the size
of consumer surplus created by the patent. Yet even if we limit
9. This will only be true if the patentee is risk-neutral and if preemptive innovation does
not independently limit the patentee's ability to profit from the original innovation in later
years. If patentees are risk-averse, patent duration will need to be lengthened more to main
tain a constant incentive to innovate. The latter possibility of preemptive innovation is dis
cussed below with regard to choosing the appropriate discount rate. See infra text
accompanying notes 49-50.
10. See Frank P. Ramsey, A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, 37 EcoN. J. 47
(1927). For a review of the subsequent literature, see William J. Baumol, Ramsey Pricing, in
4 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF EcoNOMICS 49, 49-51 (John Eatwell et al. eds.,
1987). See also Robert Cooter, Optimal Tax Schedules and Rates: Mirrlees and Ramsey, 68
AM. EcoN. REv. 756 (1978); Stephen Law, Inter-Temporal Tie-ins: A Case for Tying Intellec
tual Property (Univ. of New Brunswick Working Paper 98-06, 1998); Frank Mathewson &
Ralph Wmter, Tying as a Response to Demand Uncertainty, 28 RAND J. EcoN. 566 (1997)
(arguing that a monopolist might also use tying to implement Ramsey pricing across products
- instead of charging a monopoly price for the product it has a monopoly on and a competi
tive price for a related product).
11. This can be seen as an application of the stationarity intuition in another setting. The
first increment of taxation has a second-order effect on social welfare but a first-order effect
on tax revenue.
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ourselves to reward structures that allow patentees to extract con
sumer surplus, it is better to spread the patentees' market power
over multiple years.
If we view each year (or period) as a separate product, then the

most efficient way

-

a la Ramsey - to produce a certain tax reve

nue (patentee profit) would be to impose some tax on every prod
uct. We wouldn't expect to tax only some of the goods. But an
idealized patent regime violates the Ramsey intuition by taxing just
the first twenty years and imposing no "tax" on subsequent years.
If the periodic demand curve for the patented product remains con
stant as time passes12 and becomes more elastic as price increases,13

then it will be more efficient to raise the patentee's profits by taxing
all periods equally than by imposing high taxes on some (early) pe
riods and no taxes on other (later) periods.14
A central lesson of "marginalism" is that partial restraint of an
externality may be much more efficient than either complete re
straint or no restraint. But current patent law is curiously indiffer
ent to this traditional economic concern.

Under the idealized

regime, the patentee would have unchecked monopoly power for
the duration of the patent, and then no legally enforced market
power for all succeeding years.
Our approach is consistent with the "ratio test" developed by
Louis Kaplow.15 Kaplow suggested that in "assessing the desirabil
ity of retaining a currently permitted practice" it is useful to com12. If the demand becomes more elastic over time, then raising most of the revenues in
the first years may be efficient. But later years should still be "taxed." For example, if the
demand curve is linear and the x-intercept decreases while the y-intercept remains constant,
then Ramsey pricing would imply constant taxes over time. In other cases, if the demand
curve's elasticity increases over time, policy makers will want lower but still positive amounts
of "taxation" in the later, more elastic periods. In the probabilistic patents model, lower
taxation in later years could be accomplished by awarding lower expected damages for in
fringement in later years. For the remainder of this Article, we restrict our attention to con
stant tax rates (i.e., constant expected damage rates) during the life of the patent.
13. Most standard demand curves - including all concave, linear, and not overly convex
demand curves - satisfy this condition. See Klemperer, supra note 2,at 122. Linear demand
curves become more elastic as price increases - even though the slope of the demand curve
remains constant - because proportionate increases in price cause increasingly large propor
tionate reductions in demand. Monopolists will always increase price until they reach an
elastic portion of the demand curve, and such a portion always exists for sufficiently high
prices on demand curves that are linear.
14. The condition that demand becomes more elastic as price increases is stronger than
necessary. It relates to the second implication of Ramsey taxation, that it is preferable to tax
inelastically- rather than elastically-demanded goods. If demand is much more inelastic at
higher prices, it might be preferable to tax a small number of periods at high prices rather
than a larger number of periods at lower prices.
15. See Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV.
REv. 1813 {1984).

L.
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pare the patentee's incremental reward to the incremental social
loss resulting from the practice in question, because "[i]n general,
the higher the ratio, the more desirable the practice."16 When ap
plying Kaplow's test to patent pricing itself, one finds that allowing
patentees to exploit full monopoly power produces an extremely
low17 and hence undesirable ratio - indicating that giving paten
tees the ability to raise price all the way to the monopoly level is not
cost justified. The ratio test suggests that policymakers should ana
lyze the incremental profits per dollar of social loss on various
dimensions of patent scope. If one margin of protection produces
lower patentee profits per dollar of social loss than another margin,
it makes sense to reduce the patentee's entitlement where the ratio
is low and to expand the patent entitlement where, the ratio is high.
Doing so can reduce the deadweight loss of patents without reduc
ing the patentee's expected profits. The Ramsey intuition suggests
that just this type of trade-off is possible with regard to monopoly
pricing and duration.
B.

Implementation: How Probabilistic Patents R(fstrain Patentees'
Market Power
·

Probabilistic patents can constrain patentees' market power, be
cause uncertainty and delay can induce limited amounts of interim
"infringement."18 If the probability that the patent will be enforced
is sufficiently low, entrants may find it profitable to produce the
patented product. The oligopolistic profit that the infringers expect
to make when the patent is not enforced compensates for the fact
that the infringers will have to more than disgorge these profits in
order to make the patentee whole when the patent is enforced.
Infringement during the patent's life will tend to expand indus
try output and decrease the market price. This enhanced competi
tion implements the goal of restraining the patentee's market
power. The infringers' entry will be limited, however, because the
marginal benefit of entry is weighed against pro-rata damages. As
infringers help to drive down the market price, at some point addi
tional entry will be deterred because the depressed market price
16. Id. at 1829 n.4, 1831. Kaplow's approach is applied to the copyright issue of "fair use"
in William W. Fisher Ill, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1659
(1988).
17. Indeed, at the stationary point - the profit-maximizing price - the ratio by defini
tion is zero.
18. For convenience, the interim production by nonpatent holders is referred to as "in
fringement" - even though under a probabilistic regime, there is some probability that the
"infringer" will not need to pay damages.
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reduces the profitability of additional production and exacerbates
expected damages. The amount of this limited infringement is de
termined by the certainty of enforcement. By changing the
probability of enforcement, lawmakers can limit patentee market
power by various degrees.
Initially, it might seem that using interim infringement to re
strain industry pricing might substantially decrease the patentee's
profitability - because the patentee must split the industry profits
with the infringing entrants.19 This intuition, however, ignores the
fact that patentees expect damages from infringement. If potential
infringers enter to the point where they expect to earn zero profits,
then in expected terms the infringers will be paying all of their prof
its to the patentee.
The infringers in this stylized story are not pariahs, but perfect
agents of society - restraining the excesses of monopoly pricing
without personal profit. In many contexts, the infringing firms may
expect to earn positive profits even after paying damages for in
fringement, but the social benefits of restraining the patentee's mo
nopoly power may be sufficiently great that allowing profits for
infringement may still enhance welfare. The next section develops
a simple model to show how a probabilistic patent regime can re
duce but not eliminate a patentee's monopoly power by inducing
limited amounts of infringement.

I. A

SIMPLE MODEL

To formally capture the effects of uncertainty and delay, this
section explores how market participants would behave under a
stylized "probabilistic patent" regime. This regime has two unique
features:
(1) a patent holder would only have a right to seek compensatory
damages after the patent's expiration (patent holders could not
seek injunctions prohibiting infringement before the patent's
expiration); and
(2) a court would only award these damages with some probability
less than one.
A probabilistic patent incorporates both imperfect enforcement
and delay, because a patent holder cannot learn whether infringing
producers will have to pay damages until the patent has expired,
and this delayed decision is itself somewhat random. Thus, the
19. In terms of Figure 1, infringement might not only drive the price to P', but the paten
tee would be supplying only a portion of Q'.
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model imagines a regime in which the patentee of a true innovation
- that is, an innovation deserving immediate and certain enforce
ment under current law20 - would have to wait until the day the
patent expired to learn if a court would award damages for any past
infringement; and the court would make this determination simply
by flipping a weighted coin with, say, only an 80% chance of en
forcement. If the coin lands on "enforce," the court would force
infringers to "make the patentee whole" by increasing the paten
tee's profits to the monopoly level (what the patentee's profits
would have been without infringement); if the coin lands on "don't
enforce," infringers would not have to pay any damages.21
This model is intentionally reductive to illuminate how uncer
tainty and delay can produce higher welfare than an "idealized"
patent regime, which provides immediate and certain resolution of
validity disputes. While the thesis of this Article is not that judges
should actually flip weighted coins in adjudication, understanding
the perverse benefits of uncertainty and delay suggests that policy
makers may not want to spend inordinate amounts of money to
eliminate certain types of uncertainty and delay from the current
system.
To show how uncertainty and delay in resolving patent disputes
can perversely enhance welfare, consider the following algebraic
model. Assume that a patent is awarded for a product that has a
simple linear demand:

p
where

p

=100

-

q

(1)

=price; and

q =the total quantity sold per period.
Also assume constant marginal costs of production - which
without loss of generality can be set equal to zero.22 If the legal
system affords the patentee the certain right to immediately enjoin
20. Thus our model only admits the possibility of Type I uncertainty (the possibility that
valid patents will be unenforced) excluding the possibility of Type II uncertainty (the possi
bility that invalid patents might be enforced). We will later discuss the extent to which uncer
tainty in the real world gives rise to each of these two distinct possibilities. See infra Part III.
For now, suffice it to say that we could imagine a regime that keeps the amount of Type II
uncertainty constant but which increases Type I uncertainty. For example, one could imagine
a regime in which a court or an agency immediately adjudicated the validity of the patent but
then waited 20 years before flipping a coin to decide whether any damages would be paid for
intervening infringement.

21. In either instance, the result of the coin flip should not affect future behavior, because
the validity of the patent is only determined after the patent has expired.
22. If the product costs $10 per unit to produce, the demand schedule could simply be
rescaled to produce the same results.

Michigan Law Review

996

[Vol. 97:985

infringement,23 then the patentee will maximize its profits by pro

ducing the monopoly output of fifty each period, and would earn a

profit of $2,500 during each period that the patent was enforced.
For simplicity, let's begin by assuming that the patent is valid for
just one period.24
Now consider what would happen under a probabilistic patent
regime in which the court did not decide whether to enforce a pat
ent - in the limited sense of awarding damages for past infringe
ment - until the end of the patent's life. Let

w

equal the crucial

probability that a patentee will "win" a subsequent infringement

suit to enforce the patent. Because the enforcement of the patent
will only be resolved at the end of the patent's life, the legal rules
must specify the ex post damages for interim (and potentially in
fringing) production by other entrants. The following assumption is
made about these ex post damages:
If the court decides (with probability 1 - w) not to enforce the patent,

the entrants producing before the court's decision owe no damages
for infringement. But if the court decides (with probability w) to en
force the patent, then infringing producers must pay their pro-rata
share of the damages that would be sufficient to make the patentee
whole.25
For the linear dema.nd assumed in equation (1), the total damages
would need to be sufficient to raise patentee profits to the monop
oly level of

$2,500

that she would have earned without infringe-

23. Stiff damages or strong injunctive protection of a patent entitlement would constitute
what Calabresi and Melamed have called a "property rule. " See Guido Calabresi & A.
Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View oftlte Catlte
dra� 85 HAR.v. L. REv. 1089, 1092 (1972). Recently, Robert Merges has written several
pieces exploring the implications of property and liability rules in intellectual property. See,
e.g., Robert P. Merges,Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rigltts and Col
lective Rigltts Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REv. 1293 (1996); Robert P. Merges, Of Property
Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 CowM. L. REv. 2655 (1994) [hereinafter Merges,
Of Property Rules].
24. It is straightforward to allow patents to last for multiple periods (and to discount
future profits) - or to define a period as lasting for 20 years.
25. We further assume that infringing producers {possibly with the aid of litigation bonds)
will be able to pay these damages,that is, they will not be able to evade their liability through
bankruptcy,etc.
Instead of being liable pro-rata, one might imagine that infringers would only be held
liable for the marginal impact of their infringement on the patentee's damages. Judge Frank
Easterbrook has rejected this standard:
[T]here is the question whether [the defendant] is entitled to "credit," as it were,for the
price erosion caused by the other infringers' sales . . . . [T]he answer is no . . . . A judge
would not let the infringers play a game of whipsaw, in which each argued that it should
pay less of the damages than its share of the sales,because the price would have been
depressed anyway even had it never infringed. That approach would lead to a less than
compensatory award. Indeed it might lead to no damages at all,even though by hypoth
esis the patent holder and his licensee have been injured.
In re Malturkar Double Lumen Hemodialysis Catlteter Patent Litig., 831 F. Supp. 1354,1392
(N.D. Ill. 1993).
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ment. Thus, the damages of the ith entrant (conditional on the
court ultimately deciding to enforce the patent) are assumed to be:
i

( !l!_)
[$2,500 - qp (100 - q)]
Qe

(2)

where q� = the quantity produced by the ith entrant;
Qe = the quantity produced by all entrants; and
qp = the quantity produced by the incumbent patentee.
The model assumes that an arbitrarily large, competitive fringe of
risk-neutral potential entrants is able and willing to enter and
expand production if entry is profitable. It also assumes that the
patentee is risk-neutral, and that if there is interim entry and
production by nonpatented entrants, the patentee and the
infringing entrants will strategically choose the quantity to produce
- according to what in the literature is called a Coumot game.26
With these assumptions it is possible to derive the equilibrium
outputs of both the entrants (Qe) and the patentee (qp) expressed
solely as a function of the probability (w) that the court will enforce
the patent:27
Qe

=

(2 - 2w) 100
(2-w)

(3)

and
(4)
26. In Cournot models of oligopolistic competition, each competitor chooses a quantity
to produce that maximizes its profits, given an equilibrium expectation about the output of
other producers. w is assumed to be common knowledge. The order of play is: (1) the
patent is awarded; (2) the patentee and competitive fringe simultaneously choose output
levels; and (3) the court flips a coin and announces damages if the patent is to be "enforced."
The possibility of risk-averse patentees is discussed supra note 9.
27. Given the entrants' expectation about the patentee's quantity (qp), the competitive
fringe will entel' and increase its output until the entrants' profits are equal to the entrants'
expected damages from losing an infringement
suit. Algebraically, this equality can be
,
expressed as:
Q. (100- q)

=

w [�2,500 - qp (100 - q)]

Given the patentee's expectation about the quantity that the competitive fringe will produce
(Q,), the patentee will produce the quantity that maximizes its profits. Since its profits are
w[$2,500] + (1 - w) [qp (100 - q)] (and remembering that q qp + Q,), a profit maximizing
patentee will produce:
=

100- Q.
2
Solving these two equations yields the expressions for the patentee's and entrants' output
shown in the text.
qp

=
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This example shows how probabilistic patents induce limited
amounts of infringement. The output of entrants increases with
uncertainty (that is, as the probability of enforcement, w,
decreases). And the increase in the entrants' output more than
offsets the decrease in the incumbent's output - so that total
industry output q = (Qe + qp) increases as well. But increased
uncertainty does not induce unlimited entry because competition
drives down the market price toward marginal cost, eventually
reducing the benefits of supra-competitive pricing below the
expected cost of paying pro-rata make-whole damages.
TABLE

1: EFFECT OF UNCERTAINTY ON PATENTEE'S PROFITS
AND SOCIAL WELFARE

Probability of
Enforcement

w

Price

Expected
Patentee
Profits

100%
95%
90%
85%
80%
75%
70%
65%
60%
55%
50%
45%
40%
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%

50.0
45.2
40.9
37.0
33.3
30.0
26.9
24.1
21.4
19.0
16.7
14.5
12.5
10.6
8.8
7.1
5.6
4.1
2.6
1.3
0.0

2500.0
2477.3
2417.4
2329.9
2222.2
2100.0
1967.5
1827.8
1683.7
1536.9
1388.9
1240.9
1093.8
948.1
804.5
663.3
524.7
389.0
256.2
126.6
0.0

Social Cost

% of
Monopoly
Profit

% of
Monopoly
Social Cost

Ratio of
% S.C. to
% Profit

1250.0
1023.2
836.8
682.9
555.6
450.0
362.4
289.8
229.6
179.8
138.9
105.4
78.1
56.2
38.9
25.5
15.4
8.2
3.5
0.8
0.0

100.00%
99.09%
96.69%
93.19%
88.89%
84.00%
78.70%
73.11%
67.35%
61.47%
55.56%
49.64%
43.75%
37.92%
32.18%
26.53%
20.99%
15.56%
10.25%
5.06%
0.00%

100.00%
81.86%
66.94%
54.63%
44.44%
36.00%
28.99%
23.18%
18.37%
14.39%
11.11%
8.43%
6.25%
4.50%
3.11%
2.04%
1.23%
0.66%
0.28%
0.07%
0.00%

1.00
0.83
0.69
0.59
0.50
0.43
0.37
0.32
0.27
0.23
0.20
0.17
0.14
0.12
0.10
0.08
0.06
0.04
0.03
0.01

Table 1 shows the equilibrium price and the patentee's expected
profits for various levels of enforcement uncertainty. For example,
if w equals 75%, equations (3) and (4) predict that the patentee
would produce 30 units (20 down from its monopoly output of 50)
and that entrants would produce 40 units. The expanded industry
production drives the market price down from the monopoly price
of $50 to $30.zs
28. In this model, the fact that the market price (in dollars) equals the patentee's output
(in units) is an artifact of the particular linear demand function and not a general result.
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As is well known, reducing the market price reduces the
deadweight loss of monopoly. In this example, the reduction in
social cost is significant: infringement eliminates almost two-thirds
(64% ) of the deadweight loss of monopoly pricing (down $800 from
$1,250 to $450).29 But the patentee's expected profits are reduced
by less than one-sixth from the monopoly level.30 In this example,
the patentee expects to earn a total of $2,100: $900 on the units she
produces ($30 per unit on 30 units) and $1,200 in damages (a 75%
chance of $1,600). A crucial aspect of the competitive fringe
assumption is that the profits from infringing production are on
average all expected to go to the patentee.31
Uncertainty and delay are both necessary to induce limited
amounts of interim infringement (and their salutary effects on the
patentee's pricing). Delay is necessary, because a regime that
immediately resolved any uncertainty about a patent's validity
would recreate the all-or-nothing excess of the idealized regime.32
Patentees would immediately learn whether or not they had
complete monopoly power - so that with probability w the
patentee would enjoin all interim infringement and set the full
monopoly price. Uncertainty is necessary, because a regime that
produced delayed, but certain, decisions (therefore refusing
injunctions and only awarding damages ex post with probability w =
1), would also deter all interim infringement. Potential infringers
would know that infringement would inevitably expand industry
output above the monopoly level and thus .reduce total industry
profit. Accordingly, they would know that any profits they would
earn from infringement in the interim would be insufficient to
compensate the patentee for lost profits. • Potential infringers,
knowing that they could not break even, would not infringe.
29. This reduction in the deadweight-loss triangle is represented in Figure 1. At the
monopoly price the deadweight loss equals the area of the triangle comprising Areas B + C +
D, but the reduction in price reduces the deadweight loss triangle to Area D.
30. As shown in Table 1, profits fall $400 from $2,500 to $2,100.
31. The competitive fringe earns profits of $1,200 ($30 per unit on 40 units) but 75% of
the time must pay damages of $1,600 - so that competition induces entry to the point that
entrants expect to earn zero profits. On net, the entrants' 25% chance of earning $1,200
compensates for the 75% chance of losing $400.
32. Delay would not be necessary to induce limited infringement if (1) damages were not
set to compensate the patentee for lost monopoly profits, and (2) prospective damages were
possible instead of an injunction. Under such circumstances, the partially compensating
damages would be equivalent to a compulsory license. See infra text accompanying notes
115-27.
Even though delayed judgement is needed to induce interim infringement, the law may
not need to mandate delayed decision. As long as the patentee has the option of postponing
judgement, the patent holder has a strong incentive to delay the court's decision. See infra
text accompanying notes 66-67.
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Table 1 shows that introducing small amounts of uncertainty
reduces deadweight loss much more than it reduces the patentee's
expected profit. By itself this observation is not a very powerful
guide to policy because it does not tell us whether the benefit of
lower prices is worth the cost of reduced innovation incentives. The
next sections apply the stationarity and Ramsey pricing intuitions to
the model to show why, with either fixed or enlarged patent
durations, concerns about innovation need not undermine the
usefulness of probabilistic patents.
A. Introducing Uncertainty Without Changing the Patent's
Duration
The essence of the stationarity intuition is illustrated in the
second-to-top row of Table 1. If the probability of enforcement w is
95%, the market price will be cut nearly 10% (from $50 to $45.20)
and the social cost of the patent will fall more than 18%.33 But near
the point where the profit function is maximized - the point where
profits are stationary - small changes in price have a negligible
effect on profit. As shown in Table 1, this rather significant de
crease in deadweight loss occasions less than a 1 % drop in profits.34
While the stationarity intuition holds as a matter of theory only
for arbitrarily small perturbations in price or quantity,35 the intui
tion can hold as a practical matter for noninfinitesimal price reduc
tions. Table 1, for example, shows that deadweight loss is much
more sensitive than profits even for noninfinitesimal reductions in
price. Moreover, this· result holds for a wide variety of demand and
cost curves. The example that we can eliminate 19% of the dead
weight cost of patents while only reducing the patentee's expected
profit by 1 % suggests that policymakers should be willing to coun
tenance small amounts of delay and uncertainty even without com
pensating eXtensions of the patent life. For it seems likely that
society would be better off bearing the reduction in innovation
caused by a 1 % reduction in a patentee's expected profit, rather
than bearihg the additional deadweight loss caused by monopoly
33. Table 1 shows the social cost of $1,023.20 to be 81.86% of the monopoly social cost
($1,250).
34. Table 1 shows profits of $2,477.30 to be 99.09% of monopoly profits ($2,500).
35. As George Akerlof and Janet Yellen have noted with regard to the stationarity pre
requisite for the envelope theorem: "[F)or the [envelope] theorem to have practical rele
vance, it must be true for finite values of w, corresponding to economically noticeable shocks,
and not just for infinitesimal w
Akerlof & Yellen, supra note 6, at 711.
• • • •"
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pricing.36 Introducing discrete amounts of uncompensated uncer
tainty might reduce welfare if innovations were relatively sensitive
to small reductions in price: It would be possible to construct path
ological examples in which innovations were discontinuous in the
patentee's profits so that even a 1 % reduction in expected profit
would be sufficient to deter innovation. But our patent law is not
tailored to induce efficient innovation on a case-by-case basis such tailoring would be prohibitively expensive. In our one-size
fits-all twenty-year regime, it is much more natural to model the
responsiveness of innovation to changes in profit ' as a continuous
function.
Thus, the stationarity intuition suggests that even if patent
length is held constant, some small but discrete amounts of delay
and uncertainty might be cost-justified. The Ramsey pricing intui
tion goes one step further, demonstrating that more substantial
drops in patentee profits caused by uncertainty and delay - and
the innovation reduction that those drops entail - can be offset by
extending patent life. The next subsection shows how policymakers
might extend patent life to hold the patentee's expected profits con
stant under a probabilistic regime.37
B. Lengthening the Patent's Life to Maintain the Innovation
Incentive
·

\

For sufficiently large reductions in price, the stationarity intuition no longer holds true. Uncompensated decreases in expected
profits might retard innovative effort enough to more than offset
the benefits of reduced deadweight loss. But the range of cost
justified uncertainty can be extended by increasing the duration of
the patent's life. Lengthening the duration of the patent's validity
can enhance the patentee's expected profits a.Ila thereby offset the
innovation effects of uncertainty.38 . This section calculates how
much longer the patents would need to remain (probabilistically)
valid to maintain a patentee's expected profitability. Lengthening
the patent's validity to maintain the patentee's expected profits
36. See Tandon, supra note 2,at 474. The elasticity of sociaf surplus with regard to R&D
has been estimated to be approximately 0.10. See id. A mild reduction in profit would occa
sion a mild reduction in R&D and a correspondingly small reduction in value added from
patents.
37. Obviously, such a lengthening analysis only has practical usefulness to the extent that
statutory inertia can be overcome to actually increase the current patent duration. See
Kaplow, supra note 15, at 1841.
38. To be more precise, in a probabilistic regime, lengthening the patent's duration is only
lengthening the patent's potential validity, because after the patent expires a court may hold
(with probability 1 - w) that the patent was not valid.
·
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eliminates the concern that probabilistic p atents will retard initial
innovation; patentees' incentives to innovate should be unaffected
by a move toward a more uncertain, but longer-lived patent.39
By holding the p atentee's innovation incentive constant, we can
focus on whether longer-lived probabilistic patents enhance con
sumer surplus. It turns out that in the simple model (with constant
annual demand) consumers are better off p aying oligopolistic prices

for an extended duration than paying monopoly prices for twenty
years. To see why this is so in a world without discounting, look

1. If there is a 10% chance that the patent will not be
(w = 90%), then the resulting infringement will reduce
per period to about 96.7% of what they would have been

again at Table
enforced
profits

with certain enforcement. To maintain the patentee's expected
profits, it would be necessary to lengthen the patent's duration to

103.4% (1/.967) of its initial length.
1 also indicates that a 90% probabilistic regime
per period deadweight loss of the patent to approxi

approximately
But Table
reduces the
mately

67% of what it would be in the idealized regime.

Social wel

fare would be enhanced by increasing the patent length to
compensate for the reduction in periodic profits because bearing

67%

of the deadweight loss per period for a duration that is

3.4%

longer reduces the total deadweight loss from monopoly to 69.2%
( 67% times 103.4 % ) of what it would be under an idealized regime.
The incentives for innovation are unaffected because the patentee
receives the same expected return, but the social inefficiency of
supra-competitive pricing is reduced by more than
hand column of Table
to

%

1 - depicting

30%. The right
% Social Costs

the "R atio of

Profits" - thus shows what percentage of monopoly social

costs would remain in a probabilistic p atent regime that lengthened
the p atent's duration sufficiently to keep the expected profits
constant.40
This analysis resonates with Louis Kaplow's proposed stand ard
for judging whether compensating increases in patent duration im
proved social welfare: "[O]ne determines whether permitting the
practice would impose more cost per unit of incremental reward
than would result from lengthening the p atent life to provide the
39. Recall that we have assumed that patentees are risk-neutral. See supra note 9.
40. The values for this column are calculated as follows: Generalizing from the example
provided in the text, the optimal probabilistic regime requires multiplying the patent length
by the inverse percentage of monopoly profit produced each period by the probabilistic re
gime. The overall percentage effect on social welfare will thus be the periodic effect on social
cost ("% S.C.") multiplied by the percentage increase in the length of the patent (1/"%
Profit"), which equals the right-hand column.
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same reward."41 In essence, policymakers should seek the lowest
cost way of generating a particular level of profit. If raising the

periodic price produces a higher social cost per dollars of profit
than extending the life of the patent, then it is more efficient to

extend the duration. Applying this standard to the example in
which w equals 90%, we see that allowing the patentee to increase
the market price from
approximately

$5

$41

to

$50

(the monopoly level) produces

of social cost for every dollar of profit generated

for the patentee.4 2 But, in sharp contrast, "lengthening the patent
life to provide the same reward" produces only 35 cents of social
cost for every dollar of patentee profit generated.43 Thus, Kaplow's
standard correctly captures the enhanced efficiency of a probabilis
tic patent regime in which the patent duration is lengthened to keep
the patentee's expected profits constant.44
This simple example shows that consumers and the patentee
might want to enter into a Coasean bargain to alter the idealized
regime.

In this bargain, the consumers would extend the patent du

ration in exchange for the patentee reducing its price below the mo
nopoly level.45 A reduction in price enhances periodic consumer
welfare so much more than it reduces patentee profits, that increas
ing the patent length can compensate the patentee for reduced in
terim pricing and still leave extra surplus for consumers. This result
holds not just for linear demand, but for any demand curve that is
not overly convex - including all concave and constant elasticity

curves. For such demand curves, the social cost per dollar of paten
tee profit generated decreases as the price is constrained further
below the monopoly level.46

41. Kaplow, supra note 15, at 1829.
42. This calculation is based on $413.20 increased deadweight loss divided by $82.60 in
creased patentee profit.
43. For w 90%, a compensating increase in patent duration increases the social cost by
approximately $28 ( ($837/.9669) - $837). The social cost per dollar of profit is calculated
by dividing the $28 increased deadweight loss by the $82.60 increased patentee profit.
44. For other examples of adjusting the patent length to keep the patentee's expected
profits constant, see Gilbert & Shapiro, supra note 2; Klemperer, supra note 2, at 114; and
Manfredi La Manna et al., The Case for Permissive Patents, 33 EUR. EcoN. REv. 1427, 143537 (1989).
45. In essence, the consumers would be exchanging their entitlement to end the patent's
validity (for a few years) for the patentee's entitlement to price at the monopoly level. This
example suggests that a monopsonist consumer might have a strong incentive to enter into a
contract with a longer duration than the patent is valid for in exchange for a lower price per
period. The fact that buyers with market power engage in a particular activity can provide
strong information for policy makers seeking to promote the welfare of more diffuse con
sumer groups. See Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Partial-Industry Regulation: A Monopsony
Standard for Consumer Protection, 80 CAL. L. REv. 13 (1992).
46. See Klemperer, supra note 2, at 120-24. This is always true at sufficiently competitive
prices, because (by stationarity) small increases in price affect patentee profits much more
=

=
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This suggests that the probabilistic patent result might apply not
only to many demand curves but also to many increments along a
given demand curve. The intuition behind broad-based Ramsey
taxing is that consumers will want to trade reduced pricing for a
compensating increase in length under a broad array of demand
conditions. Thus, the efficiency of restricting patentees' pricing ap
plies not only to "local" reductions away from the monopoly price,
but also to more substantial restrictions in the patentee's market
power. Indeed, inspecting Table 1, one finds that continually lower
ing the probability of enforcement increases social welfare - even
after the patent length is increased to keep the patentee's expected
profits constant. This can be seen by inspecting the falling percent
ages in the far right-hand column. As described above, the ratio in
this column shows the percentage of monopoly social cost that
would remain in a probabilistic patent regime in which the patent's
duration was increased to keep patentees' expected profits con
stant.47 For example, if courts only enforced patents half of the
time (w = 50%), there would be substantial amounts of infringe
ment and the patentee's expected profit per period would only be
519 (55.56%) of what it would be if the patentee could charge the
monopoly price. To keep the patentee's expected profits constant,
the patent duration would need to be lengthened by 80% (that is,
multiplied by 9/5). But Table 1 also shows that the deadweight loss
per period in this equilibrium is just 1/9 (11.11 % ) of what it would
be if the patentee charged the monopoly price. Once again, the
ratio in the right-hand column shows the combined effect of an in
creased patent length and lower prices on the total deadweight loss:
bearing just 1/9 of the periodic inefficiency for 9/5 periods produces
a total inefficiency that is only 115 (that is, 20% as shown in Table 1)
of the deadweight loss of the idealized monopoly regime.
than they affect sociaJ welfare. But it is also true at all prices if the elasticity of demand is
nondecreasing, since a firm selling at a higher elasticity earns lower profits relative to the
consumer surplus dissipated.
47. As a formal matter, policymakers would want to continue to reduce price (and
lengthen the patent's duration) as long as:

a[�]
--

> 0,
ilp
where SC and lT are the expected periodic social cost and patentee profit, respectively. For
the linear model set out above, this relevant derivative is always positive, indicating that
compensated reductions in price all the way down to the competitive level are cost justified.
This derivative will be positive for all levels of w for all demand curves that are not too
convex.
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The dominance of increasingly uncertain enforcement at all
points along a demand curve that is not too convex heightens the
perversity of the result, because without more it suggests that soci
ety would be best served if patents lasted an arbitrarily long time,
but the law granted damages for infringement after the fact with an
arbitrarily small probability. This result by itself proves too much,
because it does not contain a limiting principle.
There are, however, two factors that limit the ability of
lawmakers to lengthen the patent duration to compensate the pat.,.
ent holder for lower profits per period. First, the discounting of
future profits limits the ability of lawmakers to sufficiently lengthen
the duration in order to hold the present value of the patent
holder's profits constant.

A

probabilistic regime still reduces the

present value of the social inefficiency, but discounting forces
lawmakers to add an increasing number of years to the patent's du
ration to keep the present value of the patentee's profits constant.
TABLE 2: COMPENSATING INCREASE IN PATENT DURATION AND
NET EFFECT ON EFFICIENCY (ASSUMING THE REAL DISCOUNT
RATE IS

7%

Probability

Number
of Years

100.00%
95.00%
90.00%
85.00%
80.00%
75.00%
70.00%
66.97%

20.0
20.4
21.6
23.6
26.9
32.5
45.1

w

AND STATUS QUO DURATION

OP- 20 YEARS)

Price

Present Value of
Patentee Profits

Present Value
of Social Cost

Percentage of
Status Quo
Social Cost

$50.00
$45.24
$40.91
$36.96
$33.33
$30.00
$26.92
$25.17

$26,907.25
$26,907.25
$26,907.25
$26,907.25
$26,907.25
$26,907.25
$26,907.25
$26,907.25

$13,453.63
$11,113.86
$ 9,314.05
$ 7,886.61
$ 6,726.81
$ 5,765.84
$ 4,956.60
$ 4,525.50

100.0%
82.6%
69.2%
58.6%
50.0%
42.9%
36.8%
33.60%

Table 2 shows the number of years by which it wbuld be necessary
to increase an idealized 20-year monopoly regime if the annual real
discount rate is

7% .48

Without discounting, Table

1 suggests that to

48. The total patent duration, L, required can be derived by setting the present value of
receiving monopoly profits (rr'1) for 20 years equal to the present value of receiving con
(n
stricted profits (w)) for L years:

-if'I (1 - (1 + Bt20)
Ii (l+Bt1

=

n( ) (1 - (1 + l)tL)
w
Ii (l+Bt1

which can be solved for L in terms of w and the other structural parameters in the model:

-if'I

L

-log [1 - n( ) (1 - (1 + Bt20)]
w
=

------

log(l+li)

The present value of social cost is simply the social cost from Table 1 discounted for L years.
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compensate for a probabilistic regime in which w equals 70%,
patent length would need to be increased approximately 27%
( = (1/.787) - 1). Using a 20-year benchmark, this would mean an
increase to approximately 25.4 years. But with 7% discounting, it
would be necessary to increase the patent's length to more than 45
years. Indeed, because a perpetuity has finite present value, even
making the patent's validity perpetual would not compensate for
sufficiently large decreases in the patent holder's profits per period.
In the current example (with the model's linear demand and a 7%
discount rate), compensating increases in patent duration are not
possible if the probability of enforcement, w, is set below 67%.
Second, the threat of preemptive innovation may also limit the
ability of lawmakers to compensate lower periodic profits with
longer patent validity. If technological advances are likely to make
any particular invention outmoded after a small number of years,
then extending the patentees' rights may not increase their ex
pected return. Preemptive innovation would radically reduce the
demand for the product in future periods. Because the discount
rate can also be interpreted as the probability that the patent will
become obsolete,49 it is possible to account for this technological
limit by increasing the discount rate. For example, if the risk of
technological obsolescence made a 10% discount rate more appro
priate, then it would be impossible to support enforcement levels of
less than 73%.50
Another way to approach the practical impact of extending pat
ent duration is to consider how much of a price reduction a given
increase in patent duration could support. As a heuristic exercise,
we consider an extremely stylized analysis of piroxicam, a popular
antiarthritic drug that, until the patent expired in April 1992, was
manufactured exclusively by Pfizer under the patent brandname
"Feldene." In the year prior to the patent's expiration, Pfizer sold
approximately 1.4 million units (100 20-mg. tablets) at $219 per

49. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, How Cartels Punish: A Structural Theory ofSelfEnforcing Co/111·
sion, 87 CoLUM. L. REv. 295, 315 (1987).
SO. This lower limit on enforcement levels is calculated by determining what fall in peri
odic profitability could not be compensated for by making the patent duration perpetual. Of
course, a "perpetual probabilistic" patent as a limiting case would be impossible to imple
ment because the court's decision whether to award damages for "interim" infringement
would only come at the end of time. But a similar perpetual effect might be implemented
with our "partial damages" regime, discussed infra section IV.B. Perpetual patents would
violate the Constitution which gives Congress the power to reward exclusive rights for only a
"limited" duration. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.
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unit.51 But after the patent expired, generic manufacturers soon cut
the price to $144 per unit.52 If we assume that (1) the generic price
equals the constant marginal cost; (2) the patented price represents
the monopoly price; (3) the periodic demand for Feldene is linear
and constant across periods; and (4) patentee profit equals zero af
ter the patent expires,53 then it is straightforward to assess the effect
of trading longer duration for lower prices so as to keep the paten
tee's profits constant.
TABLE

3:

HEURISTIC EFFECTS ON SOCIAL COST OF

LENGTHENING FELDENE PATENT DURATION

(BEYOND HYPOTHETICAL 20-YEAR PERIOD)
(USING A 7 PERCENT DISCOUNT RATE)

Additional Years

Reduced Price Which
Keeps Patentee's
Profit Constant

Gross Reduction in
Present Value
Monopoly Social Cost
($ millions)

Percentage Reduction
in Present Value of
Monopoly Social Cost

1
3
5

207.8
200.6
196.4

146.0
221.4
260.4

26.0%
39.4%
46.3%

Table 3 shows that even modest increases in patent length can allow
sufficient price reductions to substantially reduce . the deadweight
loss of monopoly. While this stylized example abstracts away from
many important aspects of reality, the exercise underscores in a real
world setting that nontrivial improvements in efficiency may flow
from a regime that trades longer duration for reduced market
power.
C.

The Government Has Sufficient Information to Implement
Probabilistic Patents

All problems of patent regulation ultimately devolve to a ques
tion of government information. If government had good informa
tion about the cost and/or consumer value of a particular
51. See James Kim, Drug-company backlash, USA TODAY, Nov. 4, 1992, at Bl; conversa
tion with Pfizer representative Roberta Lombardini (Nov. 3, 1995).
52. Conversation with Pfizer representative, Roberta Lombardini (Nov. 3, 1995).
53. Each of these assumptions is literally false. The periodic demand curves for patented
products do not remain constant. And usually after a pharmaceutical patent expires, the
patentee - when faced with generic competition - raises its price in order to focus on the
relatively price insensitive segment of demand. See, e.g., Ernst R. Berndt et al., Pharmaceuti

cal Innovations and Market Dynamics: Tracking Effects on Price Indexes for Antidepressant
Drugs, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 133, 151-52
(Martin Neil Baily et al. eds., 1996); cf. Zvi Griliches & Iain Cockburn, Generics and New
Goods in Pharmaceutical Price Indexes, 84 AM. EcoN. REv. 1213, 1215 (1994) (stating that
"the incumbent usually does not respond to entry by reducing its price").
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innovation, it could pay efficient lump-sum bounties to the inventor
and be done with the ex post deadweight loss altogether. Indeed,
the Ramsey broad-based tax intuition itself suggests that the ex post
distortion would be minimized if the patentees were able to impose

a small tax on every conceivable product sold. Such a scheme is
analytically equivalent to a lump sum reward funded out of the gen
eral fisc. The problem, of course, is that the government does not
have sufficiently strong information to determine how to appropri
ately reward innovation.
The current patent system - which grants the patentee a mo
nopoly for a limited number of years - is structured to minimize
the government's information requirement. Specifically, the cur
rent system economizes on the patentees' private information. The
government doesn't need to estimate the cost or value of innova
tion. Instead, the government allows the patentee to capture a
rough and limited proxy of consumer value and then lets the poten
tial innovator decide whether the benefits of innovation justify the
costs.54
The benefits of probabilistic patents could also be created by a
compulsory license regime that directly restricted the price that the
patentee could charge (possibly in exchange for a longer duration).
But compulsory license regimes face the same government informa
tional hurdles as regimes with lump-sum bounties. It is particularly
difficult for the government to estimate the demand and cost curves
ex ante and to choose a price that would represent a certain per
centage reduction in the monopoly markup.ss And if the govern
ment did know enough to set an efficient compulsory license ex
post the invention but ex ante the production, then it could go fur
ther and implement a first-best lump-sum reward.
Our argument is that lawmakers can improve on the current re
gime without knowing the exact shape of the demand and cost
54. There is evidence, however, that the returns to the patentee under the current system
may capture much less than the social value of the patent. See, e.g., Tunothy F. Bresnahan,
Measuring the Spillovers from Technical Advance: Mainframe Computers in Financial Serv
ices, 76 AM. EcoN. REv. 742, 753 {1986); Michael Kremer, Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for
Encouraging Innovation, 113 Q.J. EcoN. 1137, 1141 (1998); Edwin Mansfield et al., Social
and Private Rates of Return from Industrial Innovations, 91 Q.J. EcoN. 221, 234 (1977).
55. Compulsory license regimes have been notoriously vague about the standards used to
set "reasonable" royalties. See F.M. SCHERER, THE ECONOMIC EFFEcrs OF COMPULSORY
PATENT LICENSING 44 (Center for the Study of Fm. Indus., N.Y. Univ. Monograph Series in
Fm. and Econs. No. 1977-2, 1997). Most often, however, the license fees are set to yield a
reasonable profit above cost - instead of offering some percentage of what monopoly profit
would be. Section IV.B will show that the benefits of probabilistic patents could also be
obtained from a regime that provided patentees with certain enforcement but only awarded a
percentage of the current make-whole damages.
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curves. We can retain a system that ties the patentees' reward to
the amount that can be extracted from consumers without giving
patentees absolute monopoly power. To implement a probabilistic
modification to the current regime, the government only needs to
know (1) how to trade-off patent c�rtainty for duration; and (2) the
maximum uncertainty that can feasibly be offset with additional
patent life. Theory suggests a simple answer to the first question,
and empiricism is available to answer the second.
Trading Off Certainty and Length. Even though lawmakers
would need to know the shape of the demand and cost curves to
calculate the increase in duration needed to compensate exactly for
an increase in uncertainty (and the price reduction that it creates),56
a workable alternative is for the government to increase the dura
tion in inverse proportion to the decrease in certainty. Multiplying
the duration by the reciprocal of the probability of enforcement (1/
w) typically offers a good approximation of the exact increase
needed to assure that the patentee's expected profits are at least as
great as under an uncompensated monopoly regime. Thus, under
this approximation, if the probability of enforcement were 50%, the
patent duration would be increased to 200% (1/.5) of its current
level. Indeed, this simple reciprocal formula provides not only a
workable approximation of the exact compensating increase in du
ration, but also guarantees patentees a slight increase in expected
reward.57 In our foregoing model with w equal to 50%, this approx
imation would actually increase the patentee's expected profits by
11 % (from $2,500 to $2,777.80) but would decrease the social cost
of the patent 77.8% {from $1,250 to $277.80).58
The Minimum Certainty that is Potentially Offsettable. While
making the duration increase inversely with uncertainty neatly
solves the government's trade-off problem, policymakers would still
56. The total patent duration necessary is the standard patent duration (20 years) times
the reciprocal of the periodic percentage of monopoly profit, see, e.g., supra Table 1, which
will generally tum on the particular shape of the demand and cost curves. See supra note 40.
57. To see this, let L equal the proportionate increase in patent length needed to keep the
patentee's expected profits at the monopoly level. With this compensating increase in dura
tion, the patentee will expect to earn:
n
p

=

L[qpp

+

w(� - qpp)]

where 1Tp the patentee's expected profit and � the monopoly profit. If the government
sets L llw, this expression for the patentee's expected profits can be simplified to show that
it is slightly greater than monopoly profits:
=

=

=

1Tp

=

� + cl.. - 1) qpp

>

tr"'.

58. Note, however, that demand and cost curves can be constructed such that this simple
formula overcompensates the patentee to the extent that total social cost is increased.
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need a limiting principle to decide how much of a periodic price
reduction could be compensated for with an extended patent life.
In a world with discounting and an increasing probability of techno
logical obsolescence, lawmakers would need to estimate how many
years the patent length would need to be extended to compensate
for, say, a 90% probability of enforcement. But this calculation can
be largely independent of estimates about the demand and supply
conditions - thus easing the information requirement
considerably.
To workably calculate the maximum compensable reduction in
certainty, the government needs chiefly to know the rate at which
the value of a patent generally decays.59 And while the government
assuredly does not have this knowledge for individual patents, esti
mates of just such decay rates are available for distinct patent
classes. For example, Mark Schankerman has recently estimated
the patent value decay rate using evidence from decisions on
whether to pay yearly European renewal fees. 60 The data suggest
that there are sharp distinctions in the rate at which the value of
different types of patents decay. The value of pharmaceutical and
chemical patents tend to decay at a 3 % or 4 % rate, while the value
of mechanical and electronic patents tend to decay more quickly, at
rates ranging between 10% and 15%. These data suggest that prob
abilistic patents are more likely to be useful for pharmaceutical and
chemical innovations where there is a higher probability that the
patent will still be valuable at the end of twenty years.61
59. In a simple model, imagine that the government knew that the probability that a
patent would become obsolete in a particular year was o (which as discussed above can be
interpreted as taking into account both the time value of money and the probability of obso·
lescence). To compensate for the reduction in certainty, the government would want to set
the patent length so that the present value of the probabilistic patent was equal to the present
value of the nonprobabilistic 20-year patent. Instead of setting the patent length equal to the
simple reciprocal of w, in a world with discounting it is necessary to set the approximate
patent length equal to:
-log [1 •

Lapprox

=

�

(1 - (1 + ()t20)]

-------

log{l+o)

See supra note 48. As in supra note 57, it can be shown that this approximation produces
slightly higher expected payoffs than does the monopoly regime.
60. See Mark Schankerman, How Valuable is Patent Protection? Estimates by Technology
Field, 29 RAND J. EcoN. 77 (1998); see also Ariel Pakes, Patents as Options: Some Estimates
of the Value ofHolding European Patent Stocks, 54 EcoNOMETRICA 755 (1986); Ariel Pakes
& Mark Schankerman, The Rate of Obsolescence ofPatents, Research Gestation Lags, and the
Private Rate ofReturn to Research Resources, in R&D, PATENTS AND PRODUCTIVITY 73 (Zvi
Griliches ed., 1984).
61. Schankerman, supra note 60, at 84.

1011

Probabilistic Patents

February 1999]

The minimum sustainable level of certainty is a function of the
decay rate. For example, in a simple model where demand for a
patent is constant while the patent is nonobsolete, but where there
is a 3 probability that the patent will become obsolete, it is possible
to show that the minimum compensable level of certainty (wmin) is:

wmin
This minimum

=

1 - (1+otzo

w represents the

(5)

degree of uncertainty that could be

compensated by an infinite patent duration. If Ci equals

minimum compensable

w

would equal approximately

10%, the
85 .1 % . The

government could use its knowledge about Ci in this or a similar
equation to estimate the lowest compensable amount of certainty.
Alternatively, if as a pragmatic or political matter the policymaker
were limited to a patent duration of Lmax years, then the minimum
compensable level of certainty

(wmin)

that would guarantee the pat

entee no reduction in the present value of expected profit would be:
w"'in

=

1 - (1 + C>t20
1 (1 + otLmax

(6)62

-

The amount of uncertainty is simply a function of the patent decay
rate (a variable that has been at least crudely estimated for different
classes of patents) and the maximum practicable patent duration.

A more complicated model could undoubtedly generate more com
plicated expressions turning on more variables, but the important
point is that a government policymaker with limited information
might still be able to have some idea of how much uncertainty to
permit in exchange for a particular increase in patent life.
Indeed, the lawmaker might go further in harnessing the private
information by giving the patentee the option of trading longer pat
ent duration for less certainty. Under this regime of patentee
choice, the patentee could opt for the current twenty-year protec
tion with monopoly power or choose to extend the duration in re
turn for a lower probability of enforcement.

In

essence the

patentee would be given the choice of a schedule based on equation

(6)

and would be asked to pick a patent length and corresponding

probability of enforcement. Patentees who believed their patent
were unlikely to have value after

20 years would be unlikely to

opt

for longer durations, but an innovator with a patent whose value
was particularly long lived might prefer to trade a longer patent
duration for a lower probability of enforcement and the limited in
fringement that it is likely to engender. Even if only the innovators
62. This equation can be derived by re-solving the equation in note 59 in terms of w.
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with the most valuable patents choose longer durations, substantial
efficiency gains might be made, because a small number of the most
valuable patents are responsible for a disproportionate percentage
of total patent value.63 Of course, patentees would choose strategi
cally, and therefore the patentees' choice would not coincide with
the social optimum. Indeed, in some examples the patentee would
choose a probability of enforcement that even reduced social wel
fare.64 For this reason, we ultimately favor the government choos
ing the level of uncertainty based on the government estimate of
the rates of decay, as discussed above. But for those who give para
mount importance to maintaining innovative incentives, a probabil
istic regime with patentee choice would assure that patentees'
expected rewards would not be decreased, because patentees could
always opt for the status quo protection. While we do not seriously
propose giving patentees the option of trading off a lower certainty
of enforcement for a longer patent duration, the principle could be
applied to more practical policy issues.65

D.

Uncertainty Creates Delay

Our plan requires delay and uncertainty, but uncertainty by it
self can give both the patentee and the infringer incentives to delay
a court's determination. The patent holder has a strong incentive to
delay the court's decision because if (with probability w) the patent
is enforced, the patentee earns identical profits whether or not
there is delay - but if (with probability 1 w) the patent is not
enforced, the patentee earns much less profit from an immediate
decision. If the court decides immediately that the patent will not
be enforced, noninfringing entry could eliminate all of the patent
holder's expected profits; but if the court delays its decision that the
patent is not enforceable, then the patent holder earns oligopolistic
profits from competing against more limited "infringement. "66
-

63. Schankerman estimates: "The top 1 % of patents account for 12% and 14% of the
total value of patent rights in pharmaceuticals and chemicals, respectively, and 21 % and 24%
for mechanical and electronics patents (excluding Japan)." Schankennan, supra note 60, at
94.
64. For example, if a patentee believes that a patent will not become marketable until
more than 20 years in the future, she might pick a low w (say 50%) that creates more dead
weight loss than society would experience under the current regime.
65. For example, with regard to the Hatch-Waxman amendments, pharmaceutical paten
tees might be allowed to trade off extended patent duration for weaker preliminary injunc
tion rights. See infra text accompanying notes 93-96.
66. However, if patent damages are not expected to make the patentee whole, the paten
tee may prefer to have an immediate decision. See infra note 116.
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The model also suggests that the nonpatent holders may not
have a strong incentive to oppose delaying tactics of the patentee.
If (as the simple model assumes) nonpatent holders form a compet
itive fringe of potential supply, they should, before entering, be in
different between immediate and delayed decision because they
expect to earn zero profits in either case. If there are fixed costs of
entry (or some other factor that might allow potential entrants to
earn positive profits if the patent were held not valid), then these

potential entrants might seek a declaratory judgement that the pat

ent is not enforceable or might prefer delay, depending on the pre
cise size of the fixed cost: immediate decision reduces the expected
damages from infringement (because infringing production can be
stopped), but also reduces the expected profits from noninfringe
ment (because additional competitors will enter the market). If de

lay necessarily increases the litigation costs, either the patentee or
the nonpatent holder may prefer immediate decision; but absent
significant litigation costs attributable to delay, it is possible that de
lay will endogenously arise in a regime with uncertain enforcement

- as patentees may have strong incentive to delay and the
nonpatentees may not have a strong incentive to oppose such delay.

Since many patent regimes already create substantial uncertainty
about whether valid patents will be enforced, our model may help
explain why infringement litigation takes so long to conclude.67
II.

CAVEATS

This section explores a number of the most important reasons
why the benefits of uncertainty and delay extolled in the foregoing
model may not be achieved or might · be outweighed by additional
costs. "Probabilistic" patents may induce larger costs if they exac
erbate the expense of litigation, interfere with follow-on innovation,

or if infringing firms pay excessive fixed costs. And the projected

benefits attributed to uncertainty - in restraining patent holders
from raising prices all the way to the monopoly level - may be
overstated if independent forces restrain patent holders from set
ting monopoly pnces, or if price discrimination independently
reduces the distortionary effect of monopoly power. While this is

not a complete list of caveats,68 it gives a flavor of some of the most
67. A particularly notorious example of protracted litigation concerns an interference
proceeding that was declared in 1958 and resolved by the District Court only in 1980. See
Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90
CoLUM. L. REv. 839, 901-02 & n.292 (1990).
68. For example, if the patentee is risk-averse, it would be necessary to have a longer
compensating extension in duration to compensate for the risk that the patent would not be
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important countervailing factors when considering uncertainty and
delay in patent enforcement.
A.

Exacerbating Litigation Costs

The simple model outlined above unrealistically excludes any
costs of litigation.

In the real world,

infringement litigation carries

with it significant costs.69 It is commonly argued that uncertainty
increases the cost of litigation. But this is not necessarily true.
Rules that limit the resources spent on discovery or adjudication
might increase uncertainty (because the decisionmaker would have
poorer information) and simultaneously reduce litigation costs. For
example, reforms that limit the amount of discovery and/or limit an
infringement trial to two days at the end of the patent's life would
probably lead to more uncertainty and lower litigation expense.70
Some forms of uncertainty and delay would undoubtedly lead to
litigation costs that swamp the benefits of limited interim infringe
ment, but the point here is that legal policy could move toward pro
cedural rules that increased or retained elements of uncertainty
without enriching our siblings at the bar.
B.

Probabilistic Patents Might Hinder Follow-On Innovation

The previous analysis might also understate the dynamic costs
related to follow-on innovation.71 If a patent's life is lengthened
under a probabilistic regime to keep the patent holder's expected

profits constant, then this lengthening might further block the
emergence of valuable follow-on invention. While this criticism
may be valid, it must be weighed against the fact that a probabilistic
regime will also facilitate limited amounts of interim infringement
enforced. And while our model assumed that competition among potential infringers caused
all the profits from infringement to on average be paid to the patentee by way of damages for
infringement, one can construct models in which infringers earn profits in equilibrium (even
after accounting for expected damages). Having infringers syphon off part of the industry's
profits would also require larger compensating increases in duration. If either the risk
aversion or the infringer-profit effects were sufficiently pronounced, a probabilistic regime
would not enhance welfare.
69. See F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND EcoNOMIC PERFORM·
ANCE 454 (2d ed. 1980) (estimating total annual patent system administration and litigation
costs to be roughly $300 million in 1978); Josh Lerner, Patenting in the Shadow of Competi
tors, 38 J.L. & EcoN. 463, 470 (1995) ("[T]he patent litigation within USPTO and the federal
courts begun in 1991 will lead to total legal expenditures (in 1991 dollars) of about $1 billion,
a substantial amount relative to the $3.7 billion spent by U.S. firms on basic research in
1991."); Leslie Scism, Insurance Helps Little Guy Sue Patent Infringer, WALL ST. J., Nov. 25,
1996, at Bl (observing that patent litigation can "cost hundreds of thousands of dollars ").
70. We will return to the question of whether the law can induce the right type of uncer
tainty, infra Part III.
71. See Scotchmer, supra note 1.
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- including potential infringement from follow-on inventors.7 2 It
is accordingly possible that probabilistic regimes - like compulsory
licensing regimes - might reduce the dynamic inefficiency of the
idealized injunctive regime.73
C.

Infringers' High Costs May DiSsipate Probabilistic Benefits

Our model assumed that the infringers' entry into the market
was efficient. Competition among potential infringers caused them
to be perfect agents for society. They mitigated the deadweight loss
by competing down the monopoly price, and turned over their prof
its (on average) to the patentee. If, however, there are fixed costs
of entry or exit (or if entrants have higher marginal costs than the
patentee), the infringers will also turn some of the patentee's profits
into extra costs, which are a new kind of deadweight loss. In these
cases, excessive entry may therefore increase social costs.74

Nevertheless, when entrants' additional costs make free entry a
social bad, a correctly chosen

w

(and a compensating increase in

patent duration) can both reduce social cost during the original pat
ent life and reduce it by excluding unwanted excess entry during the
extended patent duration. For example, imagine in our foregoing
model (without discounting) that the fixed costs per period are

100.

Free entry implies that nine firms (including the patentee) will
enter, creating combined deadweight loss and fixed costs of

950.

With these fixed costs, however, it is socially optimal for only four
firms to compete.75 Setting

w

equal to

3/7

and doubling the patent

length to make the patentee whole produces the efficient amount of
entry (three firms enter to challenge the incumbent patentee) and
reduces social cost in both the initial patent period and the exten72. See infra text accompanying note 106 (discussing how broadening the doctrine of re·
verse equivalence may facilitate follow.on innovation).
73. Indeed, Professors Green and Scotchmer have shown that creating uncertainty about
follow·on innovation may increase the expected returns of the initial patentee. See Green &
Scotchmer, supra note 1. When it is certain that follow-on innovation will infringe, the
follow-on innovators may credibly threaten not to invest in innovation (foreseeing that they
will have to pay a large licensing fee). But Green and Scotchmer show that uncertainty about
whether a subsequent innovation will be infringing may mitigate this threat of noninnovation
and may thereby actually increase the original patentee's exp�cted profits. See id. at 27; see
also Scotchmer, supra note 1; Chang, supra note 1.
74. This is an example of the general proposition that with fixed costs (or if entrants have
higher marginal costs), entry restrictions may be socially beneficial. See Jeremy I. Bulow et
al., Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements, 93 J. POL. EcoN. 488,
504·05 (1985); N. Gregory Mankiw & Michael D. Whinston, Free Entry and Social Ineffi
ciency, 17 RAND J. EcoN. 48 (1986).
75. That is, the socially optimal number of firms is four, assuming the foregoing Coumot
model as set out in equations (1) and (2). Obviously, an all-powerful and all-knowing regula
tor could do better than permit Coumot competition.
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sion period. Indeed, in this example, granting a perpetual patent
(with

w

=

317)

would increase the patentee's expected profits and

reduce social cost by forever constraining the deadweight loss of
excessive entry. Surprisingly, then, fixed costs do not generally mil
itate against the use of probabilistic regimes. Fixed costs generally
imply that the optimal amount of entry lies between monopoly and
free entry levels. Probabilistic patents can be a means of inducing
this intermediate level.

Fixed costs reduce the benefits of con

straining the monopoly price, but they simultaneously reduce the
costs of extending the patent duration (because the extension con
strains excessive entry in what would otherwise be an unpatented
period). Since fixed_ costs reduce both the costs and the benefits of
introducing uncertainty with compensating extensions in patent du
ration, the presence of fixed costs do not clearly contraindicate the
use of a probabilistic patent regime. (Of course, we must be more
cautious about encouraging infringement if we cannot simultane
ously extend patent lives).

A similar analysis applies if infringers have higher marginal

costs of production than the patentee: the benefits of infringement

during the original patent period are reduced (or conceivably even
reversed) but the costs of extending the patent life are likewise re
duced (or possibly reversed).

D. Existing Deadweight Losses May Not Be Severe
If the patentee is able to perfectly price discriminate, then prob

abilistic patents would not be able to reduce the deadweight loss of
monopoly pricing (because perfect price discrimination does not
create any deadweight loss to begin with). However, although pat
entees as a legal matter are allowed to price discriminate, imperfect
information about consumer valuations and an inability to stop re
sale often prevents patentees from engaging in any more than very
crude forms of price discrimination. So probabilistic patents might
still usefully be used to increase output.
The benefits of probabilistic patents may also be overstated if
structural factors independently induce patent holders to charge
less than the static monopoly price. For example, industrial organi
zation theory suggests some such factors that might lead manufac
turers with complete monopoly power to charge less than what
otherwise would be the static profit-maximizing price, including:
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producer learning curves, network externalities, and consumer
switching costs.76
However, factors such as these do not affect the stationarity in
tuition that a small reduction from full monopoly power has only a
small effect on a patentee's profits, but has a large impact on social
welfare. The patentee will still choose a price (or quantity) that is
profit maximizing, and while the price that maximizes profits in a
more dynamic model may be below the profit-maximizing price in a
simple, static model, it will still represent a stationary point on the
patentee's profit function. These other factors also do not affect the
Ramsey intuition that a regime of certain patents can be improved
upon by probabilistic but longer-lived patents, though they may af
fect the quantitative significance of our results.77
Things are more complex if the patentee is engaged in oligo
polistic competition with the producers of noninfringing differenti
ated products.

In

this case, facilitating limited infringement may

not only affect the overall output of the patented product, but may
also affect the output of the noninfringing products. While profits
stolen by the infringers are, in equilibrium, returned to the patentee
as expected damages, any profits transferred from the patentee to
the noninfringing producers will not be recouped by the patentee.78
Under such circumstances, the stationarity intuition would accord
ingly no longer hold.79 If limited infringement induces a significant
76. See, e.g., SCHERER, supra note 69; Alan Beggs & Paul Klempe�er, Multi·period Com
petition with Switching Costs, 60 EcoNOMETRICA 651 (1992); Darius W. Gaskins, Jr., Dy
namic Limit Pricing: Optimal Pricing under Threat ofEntry, 3 J. EcoN. THEORY 306 {1971);
Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition and Compatibility, 75
AM. EcoN. REv. 424 {1985); Paul Klemperer, Competition When Consumers Have Switching
Costs, 62 REv. EcoN. STUD. 515 {1995); Paul Klemperer, The Competitiveness of Markets
with Switching Costs, 18 RAND J. EcoN. 138 (1987); Paul Klemperer, Entry Deterrence in
Markets with Consumer Switching Costs, 97 EcoN. J. 99 (Supp. 1987); Paul Klemperer, Mar
kets with Consumer Switching Costs, 102 Q.J. EcoN. 375 {1987); Paul Klemperer, Price Wars
Caused by Switching Costs, 56 REv. EcoN. STUD. 405 {1989); Paul Milgrom & John Roberts,
Limit Pricing and Entry Under Incomplete Information, 50 EcoNOMETRICA 443 {1982); A.
Michael Spence, The Leaming Curve and Competition, 12 BELL J. EcoN. 49 {1981).
77. A caveat is that infringing entry may be quite inefficient in the presence of learning
curves and perhaps also if there are network externalities or consumer switching costs, be
cause entry is likely to raise production costs or consumers' costs. See articles cited supra
note 76; Paul Klemperer, Welfare Effects of Entry into Markets with Switching Costs, 37 J.
INDus. EcoN. 159 (1988). But these are just special cases of'the issue discussed supra in
section 11.C: from the social perspective these effects reduce the benefits of infringement and
the costs of extending the patent life.
78. Patentees have at times been successful in claiming infringement damages for their
own lost sales of noninfringing products, but no court to date has awarded damages because
infringement transferred sales from the patentee to other noninfringing products. See infra
section IV.B {discussing frontiers of patent damage litigation).
79. The stationarity intuition does not fail if the patentee must compete with a competi
tive fringe of noninfringing products. For example, if the patentee of a differentiated (and
perhaps slightly better) mouse trap must vie in the marketplace against a competitive market
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increase in the production of the noninfringing substitutes (and con
sequent reduction in the patentee's profit), then the patentee may
be nontrivially harmed by the infringement. However, if limited
infringement results in a decreased output of the noninfringing
good,80 the patentee would not be harmed by a little infringement.
Furthermore, even if infringement does induce increased nonin

fringing output, the Ramsey intuition still typically applies: it is still

likely to be socially preferred to allow a little infringement over a
longer period (that is, award long-lived probabilistic patents) than
to continue with the current regime of no infringement followed by
free entry. Again, therefore, our results are only likely to be quan
titatively rather than qualitatively affected.
While structural factors may independently constrain the pricing
of many electronic and mechanical patents that must compete in
more fluid high-tech environments, there is some evidence that mo
nopoly pricing is much more of a concern with regard to pharma
ceutical products. For example, F.M. Scherer has noted:

From 1956 through the mid-1960s, the Pfizer Company and its four
licensees sold the antibiotic tetracycline to druggists at a wholesale
price of $30.60 per bottle of 100 capsules. Total sales at wholesale to
drug stores exceeded $1 billion during this period. Production costs
ranged between $1.60 and $3.80 per bottle; and when doubts about
the validity of Pfizer's patent began to mount, several unlicensed
firms began producing and selling tetracycline at approximately $2.50
per bottle wholesale. Many similar cases of price-cost margins on the
order of 90 percent for patented drug products have been identified.81

of noninfringing traps, the patentee is likely to face a very elastic demand curve. The profit
maximizing price for this downward sloping, but relatively flat demand curve, is likely to be a
much smaller percentage markup over the patentee's cost, but the logic of our main model
still applies.
80. This will usually be the case in quantity competition, as our model assumes (and is the
case for the demand and cost conditions in our simple model). More generally, the patentee
will not be harmed by a little infringement when competition is between strategic substitutes
in the terminology of Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer. See Jeremy I. Bulow et al.,
Holding Idle Capacity to Deter Entry, 95 EcoN. J. 178 (1985); Bulow et al., supra note 74. In
a price-competition model, however, strategic complements would be more likely. In that
case, limited infringement might cause both the patentee and the noninfringing producers to
lower their prices (and even perhaps increase their output) - so the patentee would be more
likely to be significantly harmed by a small infringement. On the question of whether quan
tity competition or price competition is the more natural assumption, see Paul Klemperer &
Margaret Meyer, Price Competition vs. Quantity Competition: The Role of Uncertainty, 17
RAND J. EcoN. 618 (1986); Paul D. Klemperer & Margaret A. Meyer, Supply Function Equi
libria in Oligopoly Under Uncertainty, 57 EcoNOMETRICA 1243 (1989); and the articles cited
therein.
81. SCHERER, supra note 69, at 450 (citing Henry Steele, Monopoly and Competition in
the Ethical Drugs Market, 5 J.L. & EcoN. 131 (1962); Henry Steele, Patent Restrictions and
Price Competition in the Ethical Drugs Industry, 12 J. INous. EcoN. 198 (1964)).
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Such huge price-costs margins, combined with evidence of substan
tially lower prices offered by generic producers upon the expira
tions of the original patents,82 suggests strongly that holders of
pharmaceutical patents may be raising prices to points where the
benefits of restricting market power are considerable. Certain
types of uncertainty combined with delay might produce a net ben
efit with regard to pharmaceutical (and possibly to a lesser extent
chemical) patents. Furthermore, as discussed above, pharmaceuti
cal patents are more likely to have value at the end of twenty years
and hence give lawmakers an opportunity to increase the duration
of potential profitability. For pharmaceutical products, then, in
creasing patent duration while reducing certainty might maintain
patentee expected profitability and thus maintain the incentive to
innovate.83
III.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE THEORY

This Article does not propose that courts flip coins after fifty
years to decide whether patents should be enforced. Yet appreciat
ing the benefits of uncertainty and delay can inform many questions
of policy at the margin. In particular, the model suggests that it is
important to distinguish between two types of uncertainty in patent
enforcement. The possibility that valid patents will be unenforced
(Type I uncertainty) is more likely to be efficient than the possibil
ity that invalid patents will be enforced (Type II uncertainty). En
forcing invalid patents creates ex post pricing distortions without
enhancing innovation,84 while our model showed that failing to en82. The patentee's markup can often be estimated by looking at the price generic produ
cers are willing to charge once the patent expires. See Richard E. Caves et al., Patent Expira
tion, Entry and Competition in the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 1, 36 (Martin Neil Baily & Clifford Wmston eds.,
1991) (finding that first generic entrant tends to charge 58.8% of patented price; with three
generic entrants the generic price falls to 49.6% and with ten generic entrants the percentage
falls to 29.4%); Battling the High Cost of Drugs, HARV. HEALTH LETIER (Harv. Med. Sch.,
Dept. of Continuing Educ.), July 1993, at 9 (noting that in Canada, generic manufacturers
may copy patented drugs if they pay a royalty to the patent holder; the entry of the first
generic competitor prompts an average price drop of 25-30%, and as others enter the price
may drop up to 90%). There are, of course, other extreme examples. See, e.g., Moneyweek,
(CNN television broadcast, May 21, 1994) (reporting that prices on Naprosyn (by Syntex) fell
80% just 24 hours after the patent expired).
83. Also, as large corporations with multiple R&D projects and low-cost access to finan
cial markets, pharmaceutical enterprises should be systematically less risk averse than
smaller, single project inventors. Accordingly, risk aversion in the pharmaceutical context is
less likely to contraindicate intentional uncertainty. See supra note 9 (discussing risk
aversion).
84. This is especially true if courts enforce a patent that is not novel (whose idea is al
ready embodied in the prior art). We note, however, that an optimal patent system might
want to provide some lesser rewards for inventions that do not rise to the level of strict
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force otherwise-valid patents could reduce the ex post distortions
without reducing, or without substantially reducing, innovation in
centives. This distinction suggests that policymakers should be
more attuned to eliminating Type II uncertainty than Type I uncer
tainty.ss The Type I uncertainty in the current system may not be as
inefficient as previously thought - and reforms that move us to
ward a more certain regime with ex ante injunctions may not be
cost effective.
A.

Reducing the Use of Preliminary Injunctions

Since its creation in

1982,

the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals

has made it easier for patent holders to secure preliminary injunc
tions prohibiting competitors from producing potentially infringing
products until the court has resolved the underlying dispute.86 This
strong prefer�nce for injunctive relief grows in part out of courts'
essentialist view of patents as "property": "Patents must by law be
given 'the attributes of personal property.' The right to exclude
others is the essence of the human right called 'property.' "87 The
courts' protection of patent qua property becomes an end in itself,
trumping all other conceptions of the good. For example, in a pat

ent dispute in which Polaroid successfully sought to enjoin Kodak's

manufacture of instant cameras, the court opined:

Kodak's characterization of the public interest . . . misconstrues the
very concept of public benefit. The public policy at issue in patent
cases is the "protection of rights secured by valid patents." Courts
grant - or refuse to stay - injunctions in order to safeguard that
policy, even if those injunctions discommode business and the con
suming public. 88
patentability. Type II unce'rtainty might have the benefit of generating lower rewards for
innovations that were, say, only quasi-novel.
85. General discussions of structuring legal rules to achieve the appropriate balance of
Type I and 'fype II error can be found in Krier, supra note 3; A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven
Shavell, Legal Error, Litigation, and the Incentive to Obey the Law, 5 J.L. EcoN. & ORO. 99
(1989); and Raaj Kumar Sah & Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Architecture of Economic Systems:
Hierarchies and Polyarchies, 16 AM. EcoN. R.Ev. 716 (1986).
86. See Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspec·
tives on Innovation, 16 CAL. L. R.Ev. 803, 821 (1988); William A. Morrison, Note, The Impact
of the Creation of the Court ofAppeals for the Federal Circuit on the Availability of Prelimi·
nary Injunctive Relief Against Patent Infringement, 23 INo. L. R.Ev. 169, 196 (1990) (finding
post-Federal Circuit success rate for preliminary injunctions of 52%, which author found to
be a statistically significant increase from the 36% rate from the preceding 29 years). Epic
Metals Corp. v. H.H. Robertson Co., 870 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1989), is representative of this
sea change.
87. Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, 575 F.2d 1152, 1158 n.5 (6th Cir. 1978)
(quoting 35 U.S.C. § 261).
88. Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 228 U.S.P.Q. 305, 344 (D. Mass. 1985) (empha·
sis added) (quoting Smith Intl., Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir.
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The injunctive preference also grows out of a judicial misconception
that denying injunctive relief (and making the potential infringer
liable only for monetary damages) would cause unconstrained in
fringement.

In 1987,

the Federal Circuit found that absent injunc

tive relief, "patent rights will be flagrantly violated."89 Especially

for the judges of the Federal Circuit, the decision to deny injunctive
relief is a decision to reduce substantially the expected profits of the
patentee:

The grant of a patent is the grant of the right . . . to exclude others
. . . . Without this injunctive power of the courts, the right to exclude
granted by the patent would be diminished, and the express purpose
. . . to promote the progress of the useful arts, would be seriously
undermined. . . . Without the right to obtain an injunction, the right to
exclude granted to the patentee would have only a fraction of the
value it was intended to have . . 9°
.

.

But our model has shown that even uncertain ex post enforcement
will give rise only to

limited amounts

of infringement that need not

substantially reduce the expected profitability of the patent. Poten�
tial infringers will see that as they compete down the market price

they will be reducing the profitability of additional infringement
and exacerbating the damages they will have to pay if the patent is

ultimately enforced. Therefore, uncertain enforcement need not
open a floodgate of infringement. Instead of taking an essentialist
view that the "very nature" of property entails the right to exclude,
we suggest that the nature of patents should entail offering suffi
cient rewards to stimulate innovation. Uncertain monetary dam
ages - possibly combined with extended durations - are sufficient
to achieve this end.
Doctrinally, the Federal Circuit has created a presumption that
infringement will irreparably harm patentees. This presumption in

creases the risk that invalid patents will be enforced (Type II uncer

tainty). Our analysis suggests, however, that it would be wiser to

shift toward a system with larger Type I uncertainty and smaller
Type II uncertainty.

Leco Corp.91 provides
an example of one potential shift in this direction. In Flo-Con, the
Flo-Con Systems, Inc.

v.

court denied the patentee (Flo-Con) a preliminary injunction, and

1983)). But see Atari Corp. v. Sega of Am., 869 F. Supp. 783 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (denying
preliminary injunction in part because 1200 permanent jobs would be lost).
89. H.H. Robertson, Co. v. United Steel Deck, Inc., 820 F.2d 384, 391 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
90. Smith Intl, Inc., 718 F.2d at 1577-78.
91. 845 F. Supp. 1576 (S.D. Ga. 1993).
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instead ordered the potential infringer (Leco) to put into escrow a
litigation bond:
A more workable solution than the blanket prohibition requested by
Flo-Con is to require that Leco remit monthly payments to the regis
try of the Court similar to those it would make under a license agree
ment. Requiring the submission of such monthly payments assures
compensation to Flo-Con if it prevails on the merits but avoids the
problems associated with a blanket injunction - that is, it allows
Leco to continue its presence in the marketplace and preserves the
benefits of competition. 92
Preliminary injunctions tend to resolve Type I uncertainty and pro
hibit interim infringement, leaving patent holders free to charge the
monopoly price. Increasing the patent holders' burden to justify
injunctions can promote competition and still preserve significant,
but restricted, ex post protections.
In the pharmaceutical arena, the Drug Price Competition and
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (known as the Hatch
Waxman Amendments )93 marks an analogous shift toward some
thing very akin to preliminary injunctions. Hatch-Waxman allows
the owner of a patented drug to stay for thirty months the FDA's
approval of any generic application to produce the same drug even if the generic's application claims that the initial patent is

invalid or will not be infringed by the patented drug for which the
applicant seeks approval.94 Because a pharmaceutical manufac
turer faces severe penalties for producing a drug without FDA ap
proval, the thirty-month stay provides the patent owner with
preliminary injunction protection. This aspect of the amendment is
likely to reduce Type I uncertainty.
Moreover, parts of Hatch-Waxman have the effect of reducing
the effective patent life. A safe-harbor provision in the Act allows
generic manufacturers to engage in conduct "reasonably related" to
obtaining regulatory approval for producing a version of a currently
patented drug without infringing the patent.95 This safe-harbor
provision and other provisions shorten the effective duration of
pharmaceutical patents by allowing generic manufacturers to file
92. 845 F. Supp. at 1583 (emphasis added).
93. Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21
U.S.C. and 35 U.S.C.).
94. See 21 U.S.C. § 355G){2)(A)(vii), {5)(B)(iii) (1994). This 30-month stay may be short
ened by the court if the patent owner does not act reasonably or if the court finds the patent
in-suit is not infringed or is invalid. See 21 U.S.C. § 355G)(5){B)(iii).
95. See 35 U.S.C. § 271{e){l) {1994); see also Brian D. Coggio & Francis D. Cerrito, The
Application ofthe Patent Laws to the Drug Approval Process (Andrews Pharmaceutical, New
York), Aug. 1997, at 12,421.
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abbreviated applications for FDA approval, which facilitates the
ability of competitors to begin selling generics soon after an original
patent has expired instead of having to wait until the patent expires
to prepare to seek FDA approval.96
Together these two aspects of Hatch-Waxman trade enhanced
preliminary injunction protection in the short run for decreased ef
fective patent duration. Our analysis suggests moving in just the
opposite direction. Instead of using the requirement of FDA ap
proval to eliminate interim infringement, we suggest that it might
be better to allow limited interim infringement of generics and to
compensate patentees with longer effective patent lengths.
B.

Vesting Decisionmaking Authority in Less Specialized Hands
A major rationale for the creation of the Federal Circuit was to

reduce uncertainty in the adjudication of appellate patent issues by
vesting jurisdiction over all intermediate appeals in one specialized
court. Commentators seem to agree that the court has been "suc
cessful" in reducing uncertainty - making patent litigation more
predictable.97 This is especially true because the Supreme Court
rarely reverses Federal Circuit decisions - effectively making the
Federal Circuit the centralized final arbiter of patent law. More
over, the Supreme Court has recently affirmed a Federal Circuit
decision that shifts decisionmaking power from juries to judges by redefining questions of fact as questions of law.98 Both of these
reallocations of authority from nonspecialist judges and juries to
the specialist Federal Circuit presumptively reduce the uncertainty
of patent law - for the simple reason that specialists with greater
knowledge and a thicker stock of precedent are more likely to rule
consistently than nonspecialist decisionmakers who must first at
tempt to learn a rarely encountered and complicated body of statu
tory and common law. But as emphasized above, it is important to
assess the effect of the Federal Circuit's increasing power on the
relative mix of Type I and Type II uncertainty.
96. It should be emphasized, however, that other aspects of the Act were designed to
increase the effective duration of pharmaceutical patents. See 35 U.S.C. § 156 (compensating
patentees for the patent life that erodes during FDA review by adding to the patent term an
amount of time roughly commensurate with the review period).
97. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized
Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 6-25 (1989).
98. See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 384-91 (1996) (hold
ing that the interpretation of patent claim terms is the exclusive province of the court).
Markman may also increase the use of interlocutory appeals to the Federal Circuit and thus
- contrary to the themes of this Article - may speed the judicial award of preliminary and
permanent injunctive relief.

_
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Several commentators have emphasized that the decisions of the
Federal Circuit are not just more predictable, but more pro
patent.99 Scholars, for example, have estimated the Federal Circuit
invalidates patents at substantially lower rates than did courts in the
pre-Federal Circuit era.1°0 This suggests that the Federal Circuit
has not just moved to reduce uncertainty generally, but instead has
worked to reduce Type I uncertainty much more than rype II un
certainty. Especially when combined with the strong preference for
injunctive relief, this shift in enforcement runs against the implica
tions of our model.
C.

Preferring Underinclusive Standards to Either Overinclusive
Standards or Rules

Our model suggests that underinclusive standards are likely to
be more efficient than either rules or overinclusive standards.
"Standards" (which can only be discovered ex post) are preferable
to "rules" (which can be predicted ex ante) because standards
create both the. uncertainty and delayed ex post determination
necessary to cause limited infringement.101

And underinclusive

standards are likely to create more Type I uncertainty (which we
favor) than Type

II

uncertainty (which we disfavor).

For example, the four-part test for "nonobviousness"102 may be
the type of standard that creates both types of uncertainty - and
which therefore has mixed efficiency qualities.

But Professor

Merges has argued that the commercial success doctrine - one of
the four tests for nonobviousness - "grant[s] what amounts to a
99. See Merges, supra note 86, at 822-23; Morrison, supra note 86, at 187-88 (concluding
that availability of preliminary injunctive relief against patent infringement has increased
since the creation of the Federal Circuit).
100. See Merges, supra note 86, at 822 ("Between 1982 and 1985, the court invalidated
only forty-four percent of the patents it adjudicated on appeal from trial courts, a marked
contrast to the old invalidation rate of approximately sixty-six percent." (footnote omitted));
cf Lawrence Baum, The Federal Courts and Patent Validity: An Analysis of the Record, 56 J.
PAT. OFF. SoCY. 758, 760 (1974) (showing high rates of patent invalidation in courts before
the creation of the Federal Circuit).
101. See Ian Ayres, Preliminary Thoughts on Optimal Tailoring of Contractual Rules, 3 S.
CAL. INTERD1sc. L.J. 1, 15-17 (1993); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic
Analysis, 42 DuKE L.J. 557, 559-60, 565-66 (1992).
102. To be valid a patent needs to be "nonobvious," a requirement that currently forces
courts to consider (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) the level of ordinary skill in
the art; (3) the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art; and (4) the sec
ondary or objective evidence of nonobviousness. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1,
17-18 (1966); Michael J. Meurer, The Nonobviousness Standard and the Optimal Probability
of Patent Validity (July 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Having a pat
ent's nonobviousness turn on the degree of ultimate commercial success may also induce ex
ante uncertainty. See Merges, supra note 86, at 824-26.

Probabilistic Patents

February 1999]

1025

quasi-presumption of patentability."1°3 This position is consonant
with the Federal Circuit's general pro-patent leanings, and it sug
gests that expanding the "nonobviousness" standard into new areas
of enforcement is likely to be overinclusive. Rebuttable presump
tions of patentability or preliminary injunctive relief are likely to
decrease the risk of not enforcing valid patents (Type I uncertainty)
and increase the risk of enforcing invalid patents

(Type II

uncertainty).
To see the disparate effects of over- and underinclusive stan
dards on Type I and Type

II

uncertainty, it is particularly useful to

contrast the effects of the "doctrine of equivalence" and the "re
verse doctrine of equivalence." Under the doctrine of equivalence,
courts may find infringement even though the accused product
avoids the literal description of the patent claim.104 But under the
reverse doctrine of equivalence, courts may refuse to find infringe
ment even though the accused product falls within the letter of the
patent claim - so long as the accused product "has so far changed
the principle of the device that the claims of the patent, literally
construed, have ceased to represent his actual invention."105 Ex
panding the current doctrine of equivalence is likely to be a move
ment toward overinclusion, and thus reduce the risk of not
enforcing valid patents and increase the risk of enforcing invalid
patents. In contrast, expanding the reverse doctrine of equivalence
is likely to be a movement toward underinclusive enforcement and
therefore have the opposite effects.106 The thrust of our Article is
that we can live with a standard-like expansion of the reverse doc
trine of equivalence without seriously undermining the innovation
incentives of patentees.
The choice of rules versus standards also impacts the relative
mix of Type I and Type II uncertainty. For example, an important
implication of the Patent and Trademark Office's (PTO's) substan
tive decision

not to issue a patent is to eliminate an applicant's abil-

103. Merges, supra note 86, at 842.
104. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 34-36 (1997);
Alpex Computer Corp. v. Nintendo Co., 102 F.3d 1214, 1222 (Fed. Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 2480 (1997); Valmont Indus., Inc. v. Reinke Mfg. Co., 983 F.2d 1039, 1041-44 (Fed.
Cir. 1993).
105. Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537, 568 (1898).
106. Whether an expanded doctrine of equivalence actually leads to overinclusive en
forcement turns on one's view about whether the preexisting (non-expanded) regime was
over or underinclusive. However, even if the preexisting regime were underinclusive - so
that "IYPe I uncertainty is likely to be larger than Type II uncertainty - expanding the doc
trine of equivalence is likely to have the deleterious uncertainty effect of decreasing Type I
and increasing Type II uncertainty.
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ity to subsequently sue others for patent infringement. 107 This is a
"rule-like" effect of the current regime because it creates ex ante
certainty that certain property is not protected. We do not favor
underinclusive rules, because the certainty of 'fype I error would
lead infringers to compete the market price all the way down to the

competitive level - reducing the incentives to innovate. In con

trast, underinclusive standards (where nonenforcement is only
learned ex post) only induce limited amounts of infringement that
(under the stationarity or Ramsey intuitions) need not reduce the
innovation incentives.108 On the margin, this militates against statu
tory or regulatory rules that are known ex ante and instead mili
tates in favor of common law standards that often produce
relatively delayed and uncertain adjudication - particularly if the
common law is underinclusive.
D.

Allowing Patent Holders to Leverage Patent Market Power
Into the Future

While earlier sections have shown that consumers will generally
have an incentive to trade some reduction in the patent's price for a
longer patent,1°9 the Supreme Court has prohibited such private

107. Unsuccessful applicants, however, do have limited rights of appeal. See 35 U.S.C.
§§ 134, 141 (1994).
108. Imagine, for example, that the PTO has a 5% chance of committing both 'fype I and
'fype II error in reviewing applications - meaning that there is a 5% chance that valid appli·
cations would be denied and a 5% chance that invalid applications would issue. Under our
current system there would still be some uncertainty whether the PTO's 'fype II error would
be corrected (i.e., subsequent litigation might deny enforcement to the improvidently granted
patents). Subsequent litigation might also create some 'fype I uncertainty - in that some
correctly issued patents might be unenforced. But by giving deference to the PTO's initial
decision, our current system reduces an important source of 'fype I uncertainty. Reducing
the PTO's grounds for rejecting patent applications at the margin would reduce 'fype I error
while increasing Type I uncertainty - both on the additional patents that would be issued,
and on the patents that would in any case have been issued but for which the issuance of a
patent is now a weaker signal of validity. In the extreme case, the patent office would simply
become a registry that time-stamped patent claims to create a record for subsequent adjudi
cation of validity.
The United States' "first to invent" standard may create both 'fype I and 'fype II uncer
tainty as compared to the "first to file" rule used by most other nations. While the 'fype I
uncertainty would be valuable chiefly because it creates a limited class of infringers, the 'fype
II uncertainty may be deleterious. But see supra note 84 (discussing possible benefits of 'fype
II uncertainty). While "first to invent" disputes are currently resolved relatively quickly by
PTO interference proceedings, our model suggests that it might be better to have delayed
decisionmaking by (possibly less-specialized) courts so that we could sustain the benefits of
limited infringement for a longer period.

109. See supra Introduction A and Section I.B. The parties could reduce distortion even
more if the buyer paid a lump sum fee rather than a per-unit fee. However, sellers with
patent market power may prefer royalties in order, for example, to implement second-degree
price discrimination.
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transactions. In Brulotte v. Thys Co., 110 the Supreme Court struck
down as unenforceable an agreement in which a consumer agreed
to pay a royalty for more than twenty years on its purchases of a
patented good. The Court's decision found especially problematic
the fact that the royalty remained constant in the years after the
patent had expired. But our analysis suggests that the Court's con
cern with leverage was misplaced. Negotiating a lower per-unit
royalty in return for a longer royalty time period is likely to reduce
the deadweight loss of supra-competitive pricing. And far from be
ing suspect, the constancy of the royalty over time is prima facie
consistent with the Ramsey intuition that the parties would have a

joint interest in spreading the distortion evenly across time.111 Our
analysis thus suggests that Brulotte should be overruled.
IV.

ALTERNATIVE OOLEMENTATIONS

The usefulness of limiting patentees' monopoly pricing power,
however, does not turn on this particular method of achieving this
end. Even if uncertainty and delay induce too many other ineffi

ciencies, policymakers might explore a range of other policy instru

ments to reduce patent holders' monopoly power. This section first
explores alternatives to expanded duration and then discusses two
alternative mechanisms for restricting the

market power

of

patentees.
A.

Expanding Geographic or Product Scope Instead of Duration

The Ramsey intuition shows the utility of trading longer dura
tion for reductions in patentee's market power. But the Kaplow
ratio test suggests that other trades might also enhance efficiency.112
It is generally efficient to expand a patentee's rights along the
dimensions where the social cost per dollar of patentee profit is low
and to contract a patentee's rights where the social costs per dollar
of profit are high. The foregoing model showed that lengthening
the duration right in return for a lesser pricing right was one such
trade, but other trades are possible.
For example, an alternative to lengthening duration may be to
widen the geographic scope of coverage. Instead of rewarding the
110. 379 U.S. 29 (1964).
111. See Meehan v. PPG Indus., 802 F.2d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that when
royalty payments extend unchanged beyond the life of a patent, the agreement is per se
unlawful); Boggild v. Kenner Prods., 776 F.2d 1315, 1320-21 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding agree
ment per se unlawful when pre- and postexpiration royalties are the same).
112. See supra text accompanying notes 15-17 (discussing Kaplow).
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patentee solely through a high tax on N countries, the Ramsey intu
ition suggests that it would be more efficient to produce an equal
reward with a smaller tax on

N

+

1

countries. Thus, the United

States might usefully spend greater effort to better enforce intellec
tual property rights in the rest of world rather than expending effort
to increase the chance that valid patents will be enforced with cer

tainty at home. Unsavory distributional effects of such efforts particularly on less developed nations - might be compensated for
in other ways.
Alternatively, it might be efficient to trade reduced patentee
market power for patent protection of a wider class of products
than might otherwise be covered. 113 Under certain conditions,
broadening a patent's scope will be less costly (per dollar of paten

tee profit produced) than broadening a patent's duration.114 And
even when expanded duration is more efficient than expanded

scope, it is still possible that expanding scope may be a more effi
cient way of generating patentee profits than expanding a paten
tee's power to raise price toward the monopoly level. When courts
or lawmakers are unable to expand duration, expanding patent
breadth may be a useful way to compensate for reductions in
uncertainty.
B.

Partial Damages

Giving the nonpatent holders the option of producing for a fee
that is less than the monopoly markup would induce limited
amounts of interim production.us The probabilistic patent model
could itself be reinterpreted as a system in which

w was interpreted

not as a probability of enforcement but as the proportion of "make
113. See Gilbert & Shapiro, supra note 2, at 109 (discussing this possibility); Klemperer,
supra note 2, at 121-23 (discussing in a more general model when this is desirable).
114. Klemperer analyzes the situations in which it is more desirable for society to reward
a patentee through a broader scope of coverage rather than by a longer duration. See
Klemperer, supra note 2, at 121-23. If consumers would have relatively similar valuations for
the patented product when no close substitutes were available, but would have relatively
dissimilar willingness to pay for the patented product if low-price close substitutes were avail
able, then it is relatively more desirable to give the patentee control over the close substi
tutes: that is, the patent should be broadened so that the close substitutes would infringe. If
the opposite is true - for example, if potential consumers have varying levels of need for a
product (because they would use it with different frequencies) but have similar strengths of
preferences between an easy-to-learn product and harder-to-learn copies - then a longer
lived but more narrowly construed patent covering just the "ideal" easy-to-learn product is
socially preferred.

115. The potential utility of compulsory licensing is discussed in Merges, Of Property
Rules, supra note 23; Ralpli Oman, The Compulsory License Redux: Will It Survive in a
Changing Marketplace? 5 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 37 (1986); and J.H. Reichman, Legal
Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94 CoLUM. L. REv. 2432 (1994).
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patentee whole" damages that infringers would have to pay.

In this

model, interim producers would be certain to pay damages, but be
cause the damages would not increase the patentee's payoffs to the
monopoly level, limited amounts of infringement would occur.116
However, unlike compulsory licenses, which set the patent royalty
to yield a reasonable return above cost,117 this partial damages re
gime would be set to give the patentee damages equaling a large
proportion (on the order of say 70-90%) of the losses relative to full

monopoly profit. And unlike current compulsory license regimes,

the partial damages regime could estimate the award either ex post
or concurrently as production proceeds.11s The information avail
able to the government actor ex post would be much greater than
with traditional compulsory licenses where the royalty is deter
mined before production begins.
In order for courts to implement a shift toward partial make
whole damages, they would first need to reject the strong prefer
ence for injunctions - especially preliminary injunctions. The es
sentialist notion of "patents" as "property" that by nature entails
the right to exclude has led courts to discourage interim infringe
ment even when the consumer costs of monopoly dramatically out
weigh the benefits to the patentee (and any plausible impact on
innovation incentives). If courts can free themselves of this notion,

however, they can shift away from issuing injunctions, as the issu-

116. Protecting the patentee's entitlement with partial "liability" damages may not en
dogenously induce the patentee to delay judgement. See generally supra section I.D (discuss
ing factors influencing delay). If damages do not make the patentee whole, the patentee may
prefer to gain an early injunctive decision that would give the patentee monopoly profits for
the remainder of the patent's life. (If,however, winning judgment only gave the patentee a
right to partial prospective damages, then the patentee would prefer delay as before.) Alge
braically, if k is defined to be the proportion of make-whole damages that the patentee would
receive with probability w, then the patentee's expected profits from not receiving judgment
until the end of the patent life would only be greater than the expected profits from receiving
probabilistic injunctive judgement immediately if:

qpp

+ kw

(nM

-

qpp)

>

(1 - w)

0

+
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In the linear demand example,

q
p

SOkw

p
=

=
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so delaying judgment will only be the patentee's preferred strategy if:

w < (� )
2 - kw

117.

2

(

1 - kw
l-k

)

See F.M. SCHERER, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COMPULSORY LICENSING 43 (1977).

118. If desired, there could also be a final settling up based on ex post information. Of
course, courts could demand that infringers post interim bonds to make sure they have the
wherewithal to ultimately pay the irx post award.

1030

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 97:985

ance is not mandated by statute but is within the courts' equitable
discretion.
If courts move away from injunctive remedies, there are several

elements of the current damages calculations that could be trans
formed into what in effect would be a partial damages regime. Un

like trademark and copyright law, patent law does not calculate
damages so as to force infringers to disgorge any benefits of in
fringement.119 The patent statute only requires that patentees be
paid make-whole damages - that is, "damages adequate to com
pensate for the infringement. "120 While true make-whole damages

will still often represent what Calabresi and Melamed termed a

"property rule," which will deter interim infringement, the methods

of proving and calculating such damages can effectively transform
them into a partial damages regime. For example, the widely used
standard of Panduit

Corp.

v.

Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, lnc. 121

cre

ates a standard of proof that is likely to facilitate interim
infringement:

To obtain as damages the profits on sales he would have made absent
the infringement, i.e., the sales made by the infringer, a patent owner
must prove: (1) demand for the patented product, (2) absence of ac
ceptable noninfringing substitutes, (3) his manufacturing and market
ing capability to exploit the demand, and (4) the amount of the profit
he would have made . . . .
When actual damages, e.g., lost profits, cannot be proved, the pat
ent owner is entitled to a reasonable royalty. A reasonable royalty is
an amount "which a person, desiring to manufacture and sell a pat
ented article, as a business proposition, would be willing to pay as a
royalty and yet be able to make and sell the patented article, in the
market, at a reasonable profit."122
The difficulties that patentees frequently have in proving the four

Panduit prerequisites often mean that instead of being awarded lost
profits (what amounts to make-whole damages), patentees must
settle for the smaller reasonable royalty measure. Our analysis sug
gests that this is generally socially beneficial. There are several
119. Trademark and copyright infringers are required to pay the greater of (1) what the
rights holder lost from infringement, or (2) what the infringer gained. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(b)
(1994) (copyright); 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (1994) (trademark). In our simple model, infringers
in equilibrium disgorge all of their expected profits to the patentee. But in richer models,
(for example, if infringers had lower costs than the patentee) not all profits from infringe
ment would be disgorged.
120. 35 u.s.c.

§ 284

(1994).

121. 575 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1978).
122. 575 F.2d at 1156-57 (quoting Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Overman Cushion
Tire Co., 95 F.2d 978, 984 (6th Cir. 1937) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
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other frontiers123 of the battle for lost-profit damages - including
issues of price erosion;124 the market share rule;125 lost sales on un
patented products;126 and poste:xpiration sales121 - where our anal
ysis suggests that awarding lower "partial" damages might have the
salutary effect of inducing limited amounts of infringement without
unduly lessening innovation incentives.
C.

Duopoly Auction

A system that required patentees to auction the right to use the
innovation could also induce interim infringement. A patent would
give the holder two entitlements: the right to be one of only two
producers of the product,128 and the right to receive the proceeds
from the auction selecting the second producer of the product. For
concreteness, a year after receiving a patent, the government might
auction the right to use the innovation to one additional firm.

In a

simple model, competition among firms to be the second producer
would tend to raise the auction price sufficiently so as to give the
patentee all of the second producer's expected profit.129 Just as in
123. See ROBERT
OGY AGE 306 (1997)

P. MERGES ET AL., lNTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE
(notes on the Frontiers of Lost Profit Damages).

NEW TECHNOL

124. Patentees at times convince courts that they have lost profits not only because they
sold fewer items, but also because infringement erodes the market price and therefore the
profits on the items they continue to sell. See, e.g., Lam, Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 718
F.2d 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1983). We generally favor awarding additional damages for price ero
sion so as ultimately to limit the amount of infringement, and we would even favor a price
erosion adjustment to the calculation of reasonable royalty. But the details of calculating the
rate at which the erosion damages accrue must be sufficiently conservative so as not to deter
all infringement. Judge Frank Easterbrook, sitting by designation as a district court judge,
has laid out the most sophisticated analysis of how to go about calculating price erosion
damages. See In re Mahurkar Double Lumen Hemodialysis Catheter Patent Litig., 831 F.
Supp. 1354, 1385-93 (N.D. ill. 1993).
125. Tue Panduit test requires the absence of noninfringing substitutes. Some courts,
however, have calculated lost profit damages where at least one seller ih a market is a nonin
fringing competitor by assuming that the patentee's market share relative to the noninfringer
would have remained the same in the absence of infringement. See State Indus. v. Mor-Flo
Indus., 883 F.2d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
126. Patentees - under the "entire market value rule" - have recently been claiming
damages for lost profits on unpatented components that they claim would have been made
but for infringement of a related patented product. See TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 789
F.2d 895, 900-01 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
127. Patentees have at times gained additional damages by arguing that infringement
during the term of the patent gave the infringer a head start on postexpiration sales. See TP
Orthodontics, Inc. v. Professional Positioners, Inc., 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1497, 1504-06 (E.D. Wis.
1990).
128. Tue current regime gives coinventors just this right in one situation: coinventors, as
tenants-in-common, each own an undivided one-half interest in the patent. See Drake v.
Hall, 220 F. 905, 906 (7th Cir. 1915). Thus, they each have a right to practice the invention
and to exclude anyone except their fellow inventor from practicing the same.
129. For richer models of auctions, see THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF AUCTIONS (Paul
Klemperer ed., 1999), and Paul Klemperer, Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature, 13 J.
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the probabilistic regime, the patentee would earn all of the industry

profits during the life of the patent: it would earn profits from its
own sales directly, and profits from the other producer's sales
through the lump sum payment that this second producer paid in

the auction. But the market price in this duopoly would likely be
lower than the monopoly price the patentee would charge under
the current regime. Consumers may be better off paying duopoly
prices for, say, twenty-three years than paying monopoly prices for
twenty.130
CONCLUSION

Allowing patentees to profit from their patents furthers the val
uable social objective of encouraging innovation. But as Louis
Kaplow has already observed: "It is simply not true that all activi

ties generating equal profits impose equal damages upon soci
ety. "131 Enlightened intellectual property law will try to allow
patentees to profit in ways that impose the smallest cost on soci
ety.132 This Article has pointed out that the profits coming from the
last increment of monopoly pricing impose disproportionate costs
on society (relative to, for example, allowing the patentee to earn
restricted periodic profits for a longer period of time). The tradi
tional core method of rewarding innovation - allowing patent
holders to charge a monopoly price - does not pass Kaplow's cost
effectiveness test because patentees do not extract their reward in
the least costly way.
This Article has also shown that there are policy options to con
strain patentees' pricing power that do not assume unrealistic gov
ernment information. In particular, uncertainty and delay in patent
EcoN. SuRv.

(forthcoming May 1999). For example, the problems discussed in Paul
Klemperer, Auction with Almost Common Values: The 'Wallet Game' and Its Applications,
42 EuR. EcoN. REv. 757 (1998) may be important.
130. This oligopoly auction idea is similar to the "permissive" patent proposal of La
Manna et al., supra note 44, in that both would allow multiple producers for each innovation.
But the purpose of permissive patents would be to reward nonplagiarist copiers for their
attempts at innovation, while the purpose of the oligopoly auction is merely to restrict the
exploitation of patentee power when that exploitation is not cost effective.
Michael Kremer, supra note 54, 1146-48, suggests that the government should auction the
monopoly right to the patent, but with some predetermined probability cancel the result of
the auction ex post and offer to pay the patent holder the final price determined by the
auction "times some constant markup which would reflect the typical ratio of social to pri
vate value," Kremer, supra note 54, at 1146, in return for allowing free production of the
innovation by all. Of course, this approach would require substantial government funds.
131. Kaplow, supra note 15, at 1821.
132. While this Article has focused on patent law, the stationarity and Ramsey intuitions
might also usefully inform copyright law (and possibly even trademark law).
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litigation may have the unforeseen benefit of. restricting patentees'
market power by inducing limited amounts of interim infringement.
Because the infringing firms probabilistically compensate the pat
entees (and because of the stationarity intuition), the patentees' re
duced selling prices do not need to unduly reduce their expected
profits. Furthermore, the government has sufficient information to
trade-off more substantial reductions in the price of the patented
good for an offsetting increase in the patent life. These insights
about uncertainty and delay illuminate a number of policy ques
tions, especially those concerning the relative advantages of prelim
inary injunctions versus less expansive monetary damages.

